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HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH COURTS TO THE
JUDICATURE ACTS
b. The Prerogative Courts6"'
In post-Conquest England, as in most primitive societies, the king
as the fountain of justice and supreme administrator of the laws
decided each case before him according to his royal will, exercising a
prerogative or extraordinary jurisdiction much like the oriental
justice of the Arabian Nights tales1 70 With respect to the conquered
English, the king's justice in this period was always extraordinary.
*Copyright, 1932, by George Jarvis Thompson. This article is the second
installment of Part I of a historical survey of the Anglo-American judicial system.
The first installment appeared in the December, 1931, issue of the CORNELL LAW
QUARTERLY. It is expected that the succeeding installments of Part I will appear
in subsequent issues of this volume. tProfessor of Law, Cornell Law School.
169These courts of the royal prerogative must not be confused with the two
ecclesiastical "Prerogative Courts" of Canterbury and York. See infra, under
Ecclesiastical Courts. The word "prerogative" is derived from the Latin "Prae-
rogativa", designating the privilege possessed by that Roman tribe or century
which won the cast to determine the century that should vote first. The royal
prerogative of Anglo-Norman times by which the king stood first among men
and governmental agencies is compatible with the liberty of the subject and the
supremacy of law over the king. It must not be confused with the later conti-
nental doctrine of the divine right of kings, which gained but a temporary foothold
in England during the latter half of the seventeenth century. 3 MAITLAND, op.
cit. note iI, at 246, The Crown as Corporation; PROTHERO, Geo. W., SELECT
STATUTES AND OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL DOCUMENTS (I913) 4o9 et seq.
170MAINE, Sir Henry, EARLY LAW AND CUSTOM (1883) 164; CHITTY, Joseph,
PREROGATIVES OF THE CROWN (1820) 75 e segq.; ALLEN, John, THE ROYAL PRE-
ROGATIVE IN ENGLAND (2d ed. 1849) 88 et seq.; POLLOCK, ESSAYS IN THE LAW
(1922) i8o, The Transformation of Equity; Pollock's Notes to MAINE, ANCIENT
LAW (19o6) 77-78, note F; PARKES, Joseph, HISTORY OF THE COURT OF CHANCERY
(1828) 9 el seq., 27 et seq.; LANGDELL, Christopher C., A BRIEF SURVEY OF EQUITY
JURISDICTION (1908) 23.
As pointed out by ALLEN, supra, at 8 et seq., this monarchical theory was con-
trary to the ancient Teutonic heritage of the Anglo-Saxons by which the supreme
authority rested in the freemen of the nation. The king was vested with pre-
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The exercise of his judicial power was regarded as a royal boon
granted because of the inadequacy or abuse of the ordinary processes
of the local courts and usually in return for a substantial contribution
to the royal treasury.'7' The personal responsibility of this preroga-
tive became so great that the king was glad to share its exercise with
his Council, but in time the petitions for royal justice multiplied until
they became a burden even to that body. It would seem that it was
in part at least to remedy this situation that Henry II extended the
king's justice to the people by making his writ available to all upon
the payment of a fixed fee and by creating the system of itinerant
justices endowed with much of this prerogative jurisdiction.7 2 The
existing writs were thus made writs of course (brevia de cursu) avail-
able to all as of right instead of by grace of king and Council' 73-an
innovation confirmed and made a fundamental principle of consti-
tutional law by the fortieth clause of Magna Carta." 4
rogative powers to be exercised by him as parens patriae for the public good.
And see FIGGIS, John Neville, THE DivINE RIGHT OF KINGS (1914).
The statute Prerogativa Regis, 3 HALSBURY, STATUTES OF ENGLAND (1929) 53
(c. 1324), cited as I7 EDw. II (1324) Stat. I in I PICKERING, STATUTES (1762)
376, defined certain privileges and property rights which accrued to the king
under the prerogative. Some of these attributes, such as the prerogative in the
preservation of the lands of idiots and lunatics, illustrate the position of the king
as parens patria.
The concept of the chief executive as the fountain of justice exercising the
ancient prerogative of discretionary justice seems to have prevailed in several of
the American colonies. The proprietors or governors of New Jersey, New York
and South Carolina administered an extraordinary Chancery jurisdiction.
HAWKINS, NOTES ON EQUITY PRACTICE IN PENNSYLVANIA (1925) 9, I, citing
Laussatt, Anthony, Jr., Essay on Equity in Pennsylvania (1825), reprinted in
(1895) 1 PA. BAR ASS'N REP. 221, 231.
'7BIGELOW, op. cit. note 48, at 77 et seq.; PARKES, op. cit. note 170, at 23 et
seq.; MAITLAND, op. cit. note 5, at 115; MAITLAND, Op. cit. note 143, at 314.
'
72See supra note 70. Also see MAITLAND, op. cit. note 143, at 3, 311, 314 et seg.
17 aThese became known as the writs of course (brevia de cursu) and were issued
free to those too poor to pay for them, but made-to-order writs (breiaformata),
by which the king's aid was obtained in unusual cases, continued to be very
costly. Maitland, The History of lte Register of Original Writs, 2 SELECT ESSAYS
IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY (1908) 549, at 561, 567; MAITLAND, Op. cit.
note 143, at 314 et seq.; I HoLDSWoRm, op. cit. note 2, at 47; I POLLOCK AND
MAITLAND, op. cit. note 2, at 138, 150, 195; 2 SPENCE, op. Cit. note 2, at 110 et seq.
174COKE, op. cit. note 30, at 55; 2 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 214 et seq.
As ADAMS, G. B., CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND (i92i) 136, says, "Close-
ly related also, as a fundamental principle to the 'bill of rights' of our [Ameri-
can] constitutions, is the promise of Chapter 40 that justice shall be free and fair
to all." However, MAITLAND, op. cit. note 143, at 308, wams that though slowly
gaining ground this principle had not become recognized as such before the reign
of Edward I.
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This doctrine of vested right to justice led in time to that of the
supremacy of the law. t was held that the king had abdicated his
prerogative to the extent that he had delegated it to his courts, and
that he could no longer grant or withhold justice in cases within their
jurisdiction; nor could the judges themselves exercise this jurisdiction
except in accord with the principles of the common law. But matters
for which there were no writs still fell within the prerogative jurisdic-
tion. For a time they were dealt with by creating new writs, which in
turn became available to all and established precedents that went to
build up the developing common law. Eventually the Council seems
to have awakened to the danger consequent upon embalming all
justice in strict common law precedent, 75 and to have embarked upon
a new policy of reviving and extending the king's prerogative of
justice for the sake of its discretionary character and its freedom from
the doctrine of precedent. This would seem to explain the fact that
all the higher royal courts established after the settlement of the
three superior courts of common law at Westminster were preroga-
tive courts.76 The prerogative courts, then, were those created by
the king as parens patriae, in the exercise of his residuary prerogative
of justice remaining after the establishment of the common law courts,
for the purpose of supplementing the common law justice. 17 7 Each of
these new courts administered an executive justice which in its earlier
days was essentially justice without law, 1 78 and which later developed
into an independent system of procedure and substantive law more
closely related to the Roman law than to the English common law.179
175An instance of the realization of the danger of precedent as the source of
custom is cited by ADAMS, op. cit. note 53, at 254. For the modern attitude
toward precedent, see CARDOZO, Benjamin N., Chief Judge of the New York
Court of Appeals, NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1922) Lecture 4; CAR-
Dozo, GROWTH OF THE LAW (1924) 105.
176PALGRAVE, op. cit. note 100, at 4. In token of their royal origin most of these
courts bore the appellation "High", so frequently used in describing the king. 5
HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 271; I MARSDEN, Reginald G., SELECT PLEAS
IN THE COURT OF ADMIRALTY (6 Selden Society, 1892) 27; BURN, John S., THE
STAR CHAMBER (1870) 4. Cf. 3 BLACKSTONE, op. cit. note 23, at 131, referring
to the writ of habeas corpus as a "high prerogative writ". MAITLAND, op. cit.
note 143, at 2, remarks that by the time of Edward I (1272-1307): "It [common
law] is contrasted with statute, with local custom, with royal prerogative."
17 7PouND, op. cit. note 142, at 68 et seg.; MAINE, op. cit. note 17o, at 164-165.
On the modem power of the royal prerogative to create new courts, see MArT-
LAND, op. cit. note 5, at 418 et seq. And see ibid. 69, 4O.
l?8See Pound, Executive Justice (1907) 55 Am. L. REG. 137; POUND, INTRO-
DUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (1925) 113; POUND, Op. cit. note 142, at 72; I
HOLDSWORTH, Op. cit. note 2, at 398; 5 ibid. 215.
1' The most striking departure from common law procedure in the direction of
the civil law is the absence of jury trial in the prerogative courts.
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Because of their common origin and characteristics, the prerogative
courts are classed together in this survey. Chief of such courts18 ° were
the Court of Chancery,18 ' the Court of Star Chamber,' the ec-
clesiastical courts following the Reformation, 18 and the Court of
Admiralty. 84
THE HIGH CouRT OF CHANCERY
The High Court of Chancery (Curia Cancellariae) was held by the
chancellor sitting alone. Although possessing an ancient and narrow
common law jurisdiction, it became the great court of equity by suc-
ceeding to the prerogative jurisdiction of king and council to grant
specific relief in extraordinary cases.8 8 In the exercise of this extra-
ordinary jurisdiction the chancellor did not sit as a common law court
but administered justice according to the principles of equity.8 8
180TREVELYAN, op. cit. note 119, at 277, 278. Quaere, whether the High Court
of Parliament should not also be classified as one of the prerogative courts. Cf.
McILwAIN, op. cit. note 56, at viii, 1O9, I19 et seq.; COKE, op. cit. note 7, at 15;
Plucknett, Case and the Statute of Westminster 11 (1931) 31 COL. L. REV. 778, 799.
For a discussion of the jurisdiction of the House of Lords see that subject, infra.
1811 SPENCE, op. cit. note 2, at 337; Spence, History of Court of Chancery, 2
SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY (i9o8) 236; I HOLDS-
WORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 399; 2 ibid. 596; PALGRAVE, op. cit. note ioo, at 4. Cf.
PLucKNETT, op. cit. note 5, at 241.
1825 HoLDswoRTH, op. cit. note 2, at 155-156; MAITLAND, op. cit. note 5, at 220;
Hudson, William, A Treatise of the Court of Star Chamber (c. 1625) 9 et seq., printed
in 2 HARGRAVE, COLLECTANEA JURIDIcA (1792); MAINE, op. Cit. note 170, at 165,
19o; ADAMS, Op. cit. note 174, at 248.
1 2CHITTY, op. cit. note 170, at 6, 50; I BLACKSTONE, op. cit. note 23, at 280; I
HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 605.
1815 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 16o. Other bodies administering a pre-
rogative justice were the Court of Requests, the High Commission, the Court of
Wards and Liveries, the Council of Wales and the Marches, the Council of the
North, to some extent the Admiralty, and the Council Attendant on the King,
subsequently the Privy Council.
IB2LEADAM AND BALDWIN, SELECT CASES BEFORE THE KING'S COUNCIL (35
Selden Society, 1918) xxxii; MAITLAND, op. cit. note 143, Lecture I; I HOLDS-
WORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 399 et seg.; I SPENCE, op. cit. note 2, at 77,328-341
, 407 et
seq. Also see Spence, History of Court of Chancery, 2 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-
AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY (1908) 219; WALSH, William F., A TREATISE ON
EQUITY (1930) 12 et se.; Kceigwin, Charles A., The Origin of Equity (1930) 18
GEORGETOWN L. J. 15, 92; POLLOCK, op. cit. note 170, at 18o et seq.; Adams,
G. B., The Continuity of English Equity (1917) 26 YALE L. J. 55o.
186MAITLAND, op. cit. note I43, Lectures I and II; I HoLDswORTH, op. cit.
note 2, at 215, 278 et seq.; I POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, op. cit. note 2, at 189, 193;
STORY, Joseph, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (i4th ed. 1918) §§ i9, 20; WALSH, op.
cit. note 185, at 16 et seg.; Keigwin, op. cit. note 185, at i6, 24, 35, 99; Holdsworth,
The Early History of Equity (1915) 13 MICH. L. REV. 293; BALDWIN, op. cit. note
50, Chap. io.
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The Early Functions of the Chancellor
The chancellor first comes upon the judicial stage as the chief
official of the Exchequer, 1 87 but it appears that his other administra-
tive functions had become sufficiently distinct to form a new depart-
ment of the Curia Regis as early as i199, when the Chancery acquired
its own records-the Chancery Rolls. 8 8 Even then, it was rather a
"secretariat of state for all departments"'8 9 than a court of justice.
Since it was the chancellor's duty as Lord Keeper of the Great Seal to
authenticate all state documents, he controlled the issuance of the
royal writs instituting actions at law. In consequence of Henry II's
popularization of the royal justice, applications for writs so in-
creased that before the end of the reign (i189) the chancellor was
forced to establish a writ office (Olqicina brevium), which was eventu-
ally presided over by a permanent body of subordinates learned in the
law, known as the Six Clerks.9 9 It was another century (c. 128o),
however, before Chancery began to give over following the king and
its official staff settled down permanently at the central palace of West-
minster.'' Although late in Edward I's reign Chancerywas beginning
to be referred to as a Curia, it is generally considered not to have be-
gun to assume a judicial aspect until the following reign (Edward II,
13o7-i326).,92 By 1350 (24 Edward III) it had developed into the
181This equitable or extraordinary jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery must
be distinguished from the so-called chancery jurisdiction in the Court of Ex-
chequer. See supra note 127.
'
8 8Cf. I HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 37; and at 395, where he dates its origin
as a distinct department nearly forty years later (1238) when Henry III dispensed
with the baronial chancellors holding office for life and substituted a salaried
official with limited powers and tenure of office. I POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, Op.
cit. note 2, at 193, I97; I STUBBS, op. cit. note 5, at 38r.
When Chancery developed into a court of ordinary and extraordinary juris-
dictions, the Chancery Rolls remained in the common law side, and the equity
side was consequently said by the common lawyers not to be a court of record,
because it did not record its proceedings in Latin. However, the equity records
kept in English were usually more informative than the Latin rolls of the various
common law courts. 5 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 157 et Seg.
189I STUBBS, Op. cit. note 5, at 381; I HOLDSWORn, op. cit. note 2, at 37, 395;
TOUT, op. cit. note 124, at 58.
1901 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 398, 421; PARKES, op. cit. note 170, at 255,
573 et seg. And see POOLE, op. cit. note ix8, at 6x.
1 9Plucknett, op. cit. note 18o, at 794; TOUT, op. cit. note 124, at 6I; I HOLDS-
WORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 4o2n.; I CAMPBELL, op. cit. note 143 (5th ed. 1868),
at 188.
192 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, op. cit. note 2, at 193; KERLY, D. M., HISTORY
OF EQUITY (1890) 28; ToUT, op. cit. note 124, at 31, 58, 18o; WALSH, op. cit. note
185, at I5; BALDWIN, op. cit. note 50, at 240--242.
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Court of Chancery, destined to become one of the four great courts of
original jurisdiction of the Westminster epoch.19 3
A curious sequence of historical accidents made way for the estab-
lishment and dictated the character of the Court of Chancery. Even
after the royal courts had ceased to exercisetheextraordinaryprerog-
ative jurisdiction and had become the oracles of the strict common
law, the chancellor continued to issue the writs which set those courts
in motion.1 Since new writs made new rights,'95 as they recognized
and protected new types of interests in the royal courts, the chancel-
lor threatened to become the real lawmaker of the realm. The Pro-
visions of Oxford which terminated the Barons' War (1258) elimi-
nated this disturbing possibility and vindicated the ancient practice
by denying to the chancellor the right of issuing new forms of writs
without the consent of the king and his small council. Such was the
situation at the enactment of the famous Statute of Westminster II
(13 Edw. I, 1285), the twenty-fourth chapter of which permitted the
clerks in Chancery to issue new writs in cases similar (in consimili
casu) to those in which writs had previously been issued, and provided
that if they could not agree to issue a writ, the matter should be re-
ferred to Parliament that awrit might be framed by those learned in the
law so that the king's courts should not fail to do justice in the
future.196
There has recently arisen a divergence of opinion as to the purpose
of this statute and its effect upon the development of the common law
courts and of Chancery. The traditional view19 7 has been that the
1931 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 403; KERLY, op. cit. note 192, at 28-31; I
CAMPBELL, op. cit. note 191, at 212. The famous Proclamation to the Sheriffs
(22 EDW. III, 1349) referring petitions of grace to the chancellor would seem
confirmatory that at least by the middle of the century the chancellor was recog-
nized in the capacity of holder of a Court of Equity. BAILDoN, William P.,
SELECT CASES IN CHANCERY (io Selden Society, 1896) xvii-xviii; DICEY, Albert
Venn, THE PRivy COUNCn. (1887) I7; STORY, op. cit. note 186, § 44n.
194POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, Op. Cit. note 2, at 15o, 170, 196, 203; 2 ibid. 205;
MAITLAND, op. cit. note 143, at 3 et seg. ; I HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 397 et
seg.; MAITLAND, op. cit. note 5, at 397 et seg.
195Plucknett, op. cit. note I8o, at 786; 2 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, op. cit. note 2,
at 674; MAITLAND, Op. cit. note 143, at 300; MAITLAND AND MONTAGUE, Op.
cit. note 65, at 101; 3 STREET, Thomas A., FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABiLiTv
(1906) 248.
196Plucknett, op. cit. note i8o, at 788 et seg. The statute dealt with a multitude
of subjects, for it was one of the series of great codes of Edward I by which he has
earned the name of "the English Justinian". TOUT, EDWARD THE FIRST (1893)
127 et seg.; Isaacs, Nathan, The Statutes of Edward I (1921) 19 MICH. L. REv.
804, 814; JENKS, Edward PLANTAGENET, THE ENGLISH JUSTINIAN (1901).
1973 BLACKSTONE, Op. cit. note 23, at 50-51; 2 REEVES, op. cit. note 105, at
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hardship resulting from the restriction of. the chancellor's writ-
issuing power by the Provisions of Oxford led to a deliberate modifica-
tion by the Statute of Westminster II, designed to facilitate the is-
suance of writs, and that the statute created, or at least caused the
creation of the elastic writ of trespass on the special case, or, as it
later came to be known, action on the case.19 8 But no noticeable
liberalization of the writ system occurred, and writers of the orthodox
school have criticised the common law courts for their failure to give
effect to the apparent intent of the statute and to extend the action
on the case to the field of extraordinary and discretionary relief later
preempted by the chancellor. They have emphasized the similarity
of the writ on the special case to the bill in equity199 and have argued
that a liberal interpretation of the statute would have preserved the
king's courts as a single judicial system administering both law and
equity,20 as is done in most American states today, thus rendering
unnecessary the creation of a separate Court of Chancery in Eng-
land.20 ' And in fact this would have been a logical course of develop-
ment, for the common law courts then administered much of what
later came to be considered purely equitable jurisdiction:202 they
394; I SPENCE, op. cit. note 2, Chap. 9; AMES, op. cit. note 4, at 442; MAITLAND,
op. cit. note 143, at 345-346;-3 STREET, op. cit. note 195, at 248 et seq. Cf. BALD-
WIN, op. cit. note 5o, at 238-239.
198MAITLAND, op. cit. note 143, at 346; PLUCKNETT, op. cit. note 5, at 283; 3
STREET, op. cit. note 195, at 246.
1993 STREET, op. cit. note 195, at 53. Cf. Fairfax, J., in Y. B. 21 EDW. IV 23, pl.
6 (1481), who advised pleaders of the possibility of employing the action on the
case as a means of obviating the necessity of resort to Chancery.
2003 BLACKSTONE, op. cit. note 23, at 51; KERLY, op. cit. note 192, at ii et seg.;
HEPBuRN, DEVELOPMENT OF CODE PLEADING (1897) 30, 33, 46, 88; Barbour,
Willard T., History of Contrat in Early English Equity, 4 OxFoRD STUDIES IN
SociAL AND LEGAL HISTORY (1914) 66 et seq.
bIt is clear that common law and equity originated simply as elements of a
single comprehensive system of royal justice. Adams, G. B., The Origin of
English Equity (1916) 16 COL. L. REv. 87, at 91; 2 HoLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at
192 et seq. 333 et seq.
20Even the itinerant justices exercised an equitable jurisdiction arising from the
fact that they too administered a prerogative justice. Professor William C.
Bolland advances the theory that the bills in Eyre were the forerunners of the
bills in Chancery. "This equitable jurisdiction of the Justices in Eyre is earlier
than the equitable jurisdiction exercised by the Chancellor or even by the King's
Council. It is the very beginning of our English Equity.. ." BOLLAND, THE
YEAR BOOKS (1921) 57. Accord: Klingelsmith, Margaret C., Early Bills in Equity
(1923) 71 U. OF PA. L. REv. I15.
But see I HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 336 et seq. At p. 343, Professor
Holdsworth distinguishes the bills in Eyre and the later bills in Chancery and
concludes that Professor George Burton Adams (op. cit. note 201, at 98) is correct
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gave specific relief in the real actions, among which covenant was then
classed, and employed not only the prerogative writ of prohibition but
several other writs for the purpose of preventive justice, where now
the equitable injunction is exclusively used.2 13
On the other hand, the recent research of Professor Plucknett 2 4
would seem to demonstrate that the traditional view of the purpose of
the Statute of Westminster II, and of the origin of the action on the
case, is unfounded. His study indicates that the in consimili casu
clause was not directed toward the writ-issuing power in general, but
was rather in aid of a definite group of real property interests, and
that the courts of the time, appreciating this, limited its application
accordingly. By this theory, the purpose and effect of the statute was
to extend the operation of but a few writs; to assure that cases for
which no writs existed should be promptly brought to the attention of
the body exercising the writ-making power; and to vest that power in
the embryo legislative institution, the Parliament, rather than as of
old in the king and his small council.2 15 From this it is argued that
in saying that "the ancestor of the bill in equity is to be found, not in the bills in
Eyre, but in the petitions to the Council." Accord: PLUCKNETT, op. cit. note 5, at
237. It would seem that if the bills in Eyre were not ancestors of the bills in
Chancery they were at least relatives of the blood. Powicke, F. M., (1915) 30
ENG. HIST. REv. 332.
20
"Closely connected with the writs of prohibition were the writs quia timet
(because he fears), which, like the Chancery bills of the same name, aim at pre-
venting a wrong which is threatened before it occurs." PLUCENETT, op. cit. note 5,
at 236.
2 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 246, 287, 344 et seq., discusses the decay of
Equity in the Common Law Courts. After referring to the specific relief given
in the common law courts in Bracton's day (1250), he points out that CoKE ON
LITTLETON (1628), page iooa, named six writs designed to prevent an anticipated
wrong.
"But while fully recognizing thke achievements of the Chancery, let us not
forget that the new tribunal built partly upon the older practice of the common
law and other courts whose equitable jurisdiction it supplanted. The new tri-
bunal did not originate English Equity, for it simply carried on the work of the
older courts by developing in greater fullness and with a different machinery
the equity inherent in royal justice." Hazeltine, History of Early English Equity,
EssAYs IN LEGAL HISTORY (Vinogradoff's ed. 1913) 285. WALSH, op. cit. note
185, Chapter I-History of Equity Prior to Chancery; AmEs, op. cit. note 4, Cove-
nant, 98; Barbour, The "Right" to Break a Contract (1917) 16 MICH. L. REv. 1O6,
107, reprinted in SELECTED READINGS ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1931) 500, 501;
Holdsworth, Relation of the Equity Administered by the Common Law Judges to the
Equity Administered by the Chancellor (1916) 26 YALE L. 3. I.
20Plucknett, op. cit. note i8o, in support of statement in PLuc-NETT, op. cit.
note 5, at 283.
215The practical efficiency of this administrative technique is thus described by
Professor Plucknett, op. cit. note i8o, at 796: "Henceforth the complainant was to
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the Statute of Westminster II neither directly nor indirectly created
the action on the case, and it is broadly intimated that case, like most
of the other forms of action, was the product of common law evolu-
tion.
Professor Plucknett's theory neatly explains the obstinate fact
which has puzzled the conventional historians, that when, approxi-
mately two centuries later, the common law courts did begin to ex-
tend their jurisdiction by a rapid development of the action on the
case, they did not rely upon the authority of this statute.2 8 But,
whether the halting progress of the common law in those centuries be
due to the conservatism of the courts20 7 or to the failure of Parlia-
ment to exercise the writ-making power it had arrogated to itself, as
Professor Plucknett intimates, it is generally assumed that the
developing jurisdiction of the common law was prematurely ar-
rested.2 8 The types of writs remained limited in number and in ap-
get either his original writ to proceed in the common law courts, or else a case
stated and a day in parliament for its discussion. As parliaments at this time
were generally held several times a year, this procedure caused the slightest
possible delay. Parliament, moreover, consisted at heart of a small band of
intimate royal councillors, having within call all the other official and aristocratic
advisers ready for consultation as occasion required at a moment's notice."
216Plucknett, op. cit. note 18o, at 782, 798. It is significant that in Dean Ames'
study of the cases by which the writ of case was gradually extended to cover the
field of assumpsit, no mention is made of the statute. AmEs, op. cit. note 4,
Lectures 13, 14. See also 3 STREET, op. cit. note 195, at 223 e seg.
2 07Although the chancellor could refuse to issue a new form of writ, the common
law courts seem to have controlled the matter since as early as the time of Bracton
they had obtained a veto power, in that they could declare illegal any new writ
issued by the chancellor. Plucknett, op. cit. note I8O, at 786, 793; MAITLAND,
op. cit. note 143, at 346; MAITLAND, op. cit. note 5, at lO4-1o5, 114, 222.
2 08This consequence has been referred to as "the closed cycle of original writs"
(I POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, op. cit. note 2, at 196), but it is difficult to reconcile
this orthodox view with Maitland's description of the Register of Writs, which
grew from a little book to a big book, perhaps fifty fold, even making due allow-
ance for the later statutory writs. Maitland, op. cit. note 173, at 549; 3 STREET,
op. cit. note 19.5, at 3o el seq. Professor Plucknett also seems to doubt this gener-
ally accepted view. Referring to Maitland's statement (op. cit. note 5, at ro5)
that "Henceforth for nearly two centuries the growth of unenacted law is very
slow indeed", he says, ..... [This ] is difficult to reconcile with the marked contrast
between the Year Books of Henry VII and the treatise of Britton. The great
development of the law during this period is undeniable, and it is clear that com-
paratively little of the new material was of statutory origin, most of it having in
fact been effected by enlarging the scope of actions on the case and their de-
rivatives." Plucknett, op. cit. note I8o, at 791n.
Maitland has also pointed out (op. cit. note 143, at 345) that the "statutory
warrant" of the Statute of Westminster II did encourage marked development
in the action on the case. eventually to produce Assumpsit, Trover, Case for
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plication, and if a case fell outside these several generalizations of
facts, the common law courts took no cognizance of it and afforded no
remedy.
The Extraordinary or Equity Jurisdiction of Chancery
The disturbed state of the realm during the fourteenth and fifteenth
centuries incident to the Hundred Years War with France and the
Wars of the Roses accentuated the need for direct royal intervention
to succor the weak and helpless from oppression by powerful nobles
and their underlings. Therefore, to the chancellor, as the most power-
ful member of the Council next to the king himself, was delegated a
measure of criminal jurisdiction to maintain the public peace andup-
hold the orderly administration of justice in the common law courts
by wielding all the royal power against over-mighty subjects and dis-
honest or cowed judges.2 9 As the limitation of the writ system and
the turbulence of the realm hardened the common law into its strict
and narrow procedural moulds,210 the people turned again to the
ancient extraordinary jurisdiction of king and council to supple-
ment its deficiencies and to relieve from the harshness of its applica-
tion. Since the chancellor, as head of the writ office, was in the best
position to know the scope and defects of the common law jurisdic-
tion, it became the custom to refer these petitions to him, with author-
ity to exercise the extraordinary jurisdiction, rather than to the
common law judges. It would seem that in this period the common
law judges were not averse to the developing jurisdiction of the chan-
Deceit, Case for Words, e. g., Defamation, etc. 3 STREET, op. it. note 195, at
248-250, refers to the "stimulus" of the statute upon the extension of case. Cf.
Plucknett, op. cit. note 18o, at 786, 796.
211BAiLDON, op. cit. note 193, at xliv; 5 HOLDSWORTH, op. it. note 2, at 282,
289; I ibid. 405. The Star Chamber succeeded to this criminal jurisdiction of
equity in the late fifteenth century. See infra note 295.
21 Although there was in the early stages of the development of Chancery
some competition with the'common law equity jurisdiction, the latter was soon
relinquished by the judges, apparently because they felt that the chancellor
could exercise it more advantageously by way of supplementing legal justice.
PLUCKNETT, op. cit. note 5, at 234; MAITLAND, Op. Cit. note 143, at 18, 156; 1
HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 447; 5 ibid. 215; ADAMS, op. cit. note 174, at 112.
The effect of the boisterous fourteenth and fifteenth centuries upon the common
law bears out Cicero's famous maxim: "Silent enim leges inter arma" (for the law is
silent amid arms) (Pro Milone IV). Professor Holdsworth considers the fact
that the common law courts had no vigorous rivals in the fourteenth and fifteenth
centuries an important contributing element in the comparatively static con-
dition of the law during that period. 2 HoLDswoRTH, op. cit. note 2, at 252.
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cellor for they commonly sat with him or advised him.21' As it be-
came the normal thing for the chancellor to pass upon these petitions,
the petitioners began to address them directly to the chancellor, and
gradually the Chancery became an independent prerogative tribunal
-- greatest of the organs of prerogative justice.2 12
The chief reasons for the growth of this extraordinary jurisdiction
of the chancellor may be summarized as follows :213
i. The formality and technicality of common law pleading not only
limited the scope of jurisdiction of the common law courts, as pointed
out above, but rendered justice expensive and dilatory. In contrast,
the early equity pleadings were informal, inexpensive and few in
number.
2. The inefficiency of common law trial by jury was accentuated in
the early days of Chancery, owing to the fact that this method of trial
was then in transition from the jury of witnesses to the jury of im-
partial triers of the fact. Even as finally developed, trial by jury
hampered the common law by the requirement of singleness of issue
in pleading, by the narrowness of the rules of evidence, and by the
restriction of jurisdiction to a simple two-sided case, terminating in a
formal judgment for one side or the other. Chancery, on the other
hand, dealt with complex cases involving many different conflicting
interests, since it could form decrees to adjust the several rights of the
various parties as against each other, although they were on the same
side of the case. It also provided a procedure for discovery, whereby
a party was made to produce evidence he controlled, and permitted
21For a century or more, however, the Chancellor's Court was really a division
of the Council to which was delegated the hearing of those petitions referred to it
by king and Council. It was common for the Council to endorse instructions or
suggestions to the chancellor upon such petitions. Indeed, during this period it
was customary for the chancellor to invite some members of the Council or some
of the common law judges to sit with him in trial of cases, and his decrees were
made upon their advice and consent, or subject to approval of king and Council.
"It was not till 1474 that we get a case in which the Chancellor made a decree
by his own authority..." I HOLDSWORTH, op. Cit. note 2, at 404, 399 et seq.,
and 45r; 2 ibid. 414; 4 ibid. 277; 5 ibid. 283. MAITLAND, op. cit. note 143, at 3;
KERLY, op. cit. note 192, at 28-36, 38; PLUCKNETT, op. cit. note 5, at 240; WALSH,
op. cit. note 185, at 15; 3 STREET, op. cit. note 195, at 31.
2121 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 400.
2131 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 405, 454 et seq.; 5 ibid. 279 et seg.; PLUcK-
NETT, op. cit. note 5, at 241; MAITLAND, op. cit. note 143, at 12 et seq.; Pound,
The End of Law as Developed in Legal Rules and Doctrines (1914) 27 HARV. L.
REv. 195; 3 STREET, op. cit. note 195, at 52 et seg.; WALSH, op. Cit. note 185, at 12
et seq.; Holdsworth, Blackstone's Treatment of Equity (1929) 43 HARV. L. REV.
I. Cf. Pound, The Decadence of Equity (1905) 5 COL. L. REV. 20 et seq.; Isaacs,
Nathan, The Limits of Judicial Discretion (1923) 32 YALE L. J. 339.
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examination of the parties as witnesses, neither of which was possible
at law.
3. The law functioned in the past, not in the present. The judgment
at law determined the rights of the respective parties as of the date
of the original writ, while in Chancery the decree spoke as of the day
of its issue. There was no recovery in an action at law for damage
done the plaintiff by the defendant after issuance of the original writ.
A new action must be brought for such further injury.2 1 4
4. The common law courts administered a remedial justice rather
than a preventive justice. They could compensate for injuries done
but were helpless to enjoin or prevent the commission of an irre-
parable injury. Equity, however, could enjoin a threatened irrepar-
able wrong.
5. The courts of law gave only a general relief of money damages in
personal actions, whereas the chancellor could give specific relief
adapted to the needs of the instant case by ordering the defendant to
do or not do a particular thing.
6. The rigidity of the substantive common law bound it to the
development of rules from precedent and their automatic applica-
tion without regard to the moral justification in the particular case.
Frequently it happened either that the common law provided no
remedy or that some stubborn rule of the substantive law prevented
the application of the usual remedy. 15 Chancery subjected each case
to the test of good conscience and equity.218
7. The Court of Chancery recognized and protected interests which
the common law did not, and provided equitable remedies to enforce
these equitable rights. For example, it recognized the interest of the
cestui que trust (the beneficiary) in the trust property, although the
entire legal title was vested in the trustee, and gave relief from fraud,
accident and mistake under circumstances where the law would not
tolerate such equitable claims 117
> :8. A superior sanction lay behind Chancery procedure in that
recalcitrant defendants were deemed to be in contempt of king and
Council, and, therefore, subjected to the summary coercion of the
2t4Park & Sons v. Hubbard, 198 N. Y. 136, 84 N. E. 303 (1910).
215For example, the substantive law doctrine of feme covert, whereby a married
woman could neither be a party to a contract nor own personal property, on the
theory of the identity of her personality with that of her husband. Barbour, op.
cit. note 2oo, at 56.
2I11 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 456; 4ibid. 281; 5 ibid. 216.
217Barbour, op. cit. note 20o, at 71 et seq.; MAITLAND, op. cit. note 143, at 7 el
seq., 29 et seq.; AmES, Specialty Contracts and Equitable Defenses, op. cit. note 4, at
104; POUND, INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY (1923) 133.
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royal executive power to quell their incipient rebellion.2 18 This in
personam enforcement of equitable decrees by imprisonment of the
disobedient defendant is the real meaning of the maxim-"Equity
acts in personam."
In the adjustment of these two great systems of law and equity, the
chancellor came to possess three types of jurisdiction :219
I. An exclusive equitable jurisdiction with respect to such matters as
were recognized and enforced only in equity, as, for instance, uses and
trusts.
2. A concurrent jurisdiction as to matters for which the law also
provided a remedy but usually of a less efficient character. This
jurisdiction was exercised where the available legal remedy was in-
adequate, as in the case of specific performance of certain contracts
and injunctions against the commission of certain torts.
3. An auxiliary jurisdiction in aid of legal remedies. Some exam-
ples of this jurisdiction are bills to take testimony, to preserve testi-
mony, for discovery as to whereabouts and contents of papers on
which a right or defense is based, for examination of a party before
trial, and for reformation of a contract which has been written
inaccurately.
The evolution of this extraordinary or equity jurisdiction of the
court of Chancery began with a simple administrative delegation of
the royal prerogative of justice to the Lord Chancellor, a high ec-
clesiastic who exercised this jurisdiction in accord with the canonical
standard of justice of his time. There followed a gradual transition
until it became a supplemental jurisdiction to supply the deficiencies
of the common law and to prevent abuse of legal process. With the
new nationalism of the reformation and its emphasis upon the king's
spiritual as well as secular headship there dawns the classical view
of Chancery as the court of conscience.20 Paradoxical as it may seem,
2'8"The chancellor by reason of his close connection with the Council, could
act with the whole force of the executive government, enforcing his orders in the
last resort by a commission of rebellion." 5 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 286.
Cf. POUND, op. cit. note 142, at 72.
2191 POMEROY, John Norton, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed. 1918) 165 et
seQ.; CLARK, George L., PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY (1919) § 34. LANGDELL, Op. Cit.
note 17o, at 22 et seg., criticizes this orthodox terminology as applied to these three
situations because the meaning here is so different from that of the same terms
when applied to the jurisdiction of the common law courts.
22OTo Cardinal Wolsey, last of the great ecclesiastical chancellors, has been
attributed the separation of Chancery from the Council and the Star Chamber as
a distinct court of conscience. PLUCKNETr, op. cit. note 5, at 246.
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almost coincident with the introduction of secular chancellors ' the
canon law theory of the chancellor as spiritual keeper of the king's
conscience began to be emphasized to the subordination of the old
primitive view of the king as the fountain of justice, and soon became
the primary basis of equity jurisdiction.22 This attempt to rationalize
the equitable jurisdiction of Chancery by subjecting it to the stand-
ard of a non-existent, idealistic royal conscience set up a fictitious
objective test which furnished a juristic basis for its subsequent
development. No longer was it a practical, executive justice ad-
ministered at the whim of the particular chancellor.22 The crystal-
rnPLucKNETT, op. cit. note 5, at 241, says: "It is more significant that these
Chancellors were in many cases not merely laymen but also common lawyers,
such as Nicholas Bacon (1558-1579) and Thomas Bromley (1579-1587)." I
SPENCE, op. cit. note 2, at 712, points out that the change from ecclesiastical to lay
chancellors retarded the growth of equity since the latter were unfamiliar with
the principles of the civil law and canon law which had guided the ecclesiastical
chancellors. 5 HoLDswoRTH, op. cit. note 2, at 222. 2 CAMPBELL, op. cit. note 143,
at 492, considers the transition inevitable and beneficial.
m2These two theories seem always to have been more or less interwoven with
the underlying basis of equity jurisdiction, the emphasis simply shifting from
the will of the sovereign to the idealized conscience of the same sovereign.
The accepted view today is that the classical theory of Chancery as a court of
conscience is to be credited to the influence of ST. GERMAIN'S DIALOGUE OF
DOCTOR AND STUDENT, published in English 1530, in which this old canon law
theory was presented in simple language and thus popularized in the very years
of the Church's fall from power. 5 HOLDSWORTn, op. cit. note 2, at 266 et seg.;
Vinogradoff, Reason and Conscience in Sixteenth Century Jurisprudence (19o8)
24 L. Q. REv. 374; PLUCKNETT, op. cit. note 5, at 238 et seg. Dean Pound has
pointed out that the accepted juristic concepts of one age normally embody the
ideals of a past age quite unrelated to the realities of the age in which they func-
tion, op. cit. note I, at 554.
2
2The seventeenth century dissatisfaction with arbitrary justice which greatly
influenced the formulation of guiding principles in equity was quaintly expressed
by the learned common lawyer, John Selden, as reported in his TABLE TALK
(published in 1689, Pollock's ed. 1927) 43: "Equity is A Roguish thing, for Law
we have a measure know what to trust too. Equity is according to the conscience
of him that is Chancellor, and as it is larger or narrower soe is equity. Tis all one
as if they should make the Standard for the measure we call A foot, to be the
Chancellors foot; what an uncertain measure would this be; one Chancellor ha's
a long foot another A short foot a third an indifferent foot; tis the same thing in
the Chancellors Conscience." And see 5 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 336
et seg.
In 5 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 275, this process of crystallization is
described: "As early as 1483 the chancellor could say that it was the 'common
course' of the Chancery to grant relief in certain cases, and that it was so re-
corded. But when a court has acquired a 'common course' which is recorded, it
soon develops fixed rules of practice, which, in their turn, gradually create fixed
substantive rules. No doubt this process operated more slowly in the case of the
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lization of the doctrines of equity into a system of equitable juris-
prudence, which received much impetus during the chancellorships
of Lord Nottingham (1675-1692) and Lord Hardwicke (1737-I757),
became inevitable. By the end of Lord Eldon's chancellorship
(i8oi-i8o6; 1807-1827), this long progress had culminated in a well-
defined body of substantive equitable principles and precedents, with
a distinct system of equity pleading and practice. Equity had not
been put in a straight-jacket, however, for under the better viewm
the new order is tempered by the retention of a wide discretion in the
chancellor, and the conscious preservation of a spirit of growth in
accord with the ancient tradition of the court of Chancery.M
Chancery than in the case of the courts of common law, because, all through this
period, equity was equity-it tried to lay down the ideally just rule applicable
to the circumstances of each particular case. But the influence of the new school
of lawyer chancellors was beginning to be felt at the end of the sixteenth century.
Lambard, who, as we have seen, was a master in Chancery, notes that the
question, 'whether it be meete that the Chancellour should appoint unto himselfe
and publish to others any certain rules and limits of equity,' was one 'about the
which men both godly and learned doe varie in opinion;' and it is clear that
the opinion in favour of an affirmative answer to this question was growing in
strength. As we have seen, the Chancery Orders were beginning to lay down a
few fixed rules; and we shall see that Lambard himself thought it worth while
to make a collection of cases that seemed to him to be notable. In fact, the evi-
dence both of the records of the court and of the cases points in the same direction.
At the very beginning of the seventeenth century the records show that for the de-
cision of certain points recourse was had to precedent."
mThe modern problem, on which the authorities divide, is whether, in a case
falling within the established equity jurisdiction, the court may on balancing the
equities wihhold equitable relief in its discretion, or whether in such a case
the equitablerelief is a matter, no longer of grace, but of right. An illustrative case
is that of a continuing injury to land, for which legal damages are inadequate.
It has been suggested that to deny an injunction under such circumstances
would be unconstitutional. Hennessy v. Carmony, 5o N. J. Eq. 616, 25 Atl. 374
(1892). Many American courts, however, balance the equities and award an
injunction only in their discretion. Simmons v. City of Paterson, 60 N. J. Eq.
385,45 Atl. 995 (I9oo). On the general subject see Hulbert v. California Portland
Cement Co., i61 Cal. 239, 118 Pac. 928, 38 L. R. A. (N. s.) 436 (1911); Chafee,
Zechariah, The Progress of the Law, 1919-1920 (1921) 34 Harv. L. Rev. 388, 394;
(1922) 36 HARv. L. REV. 211; (1923) 9 CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY 63; (1927)
37 YALE L. J. 96; (1929) 61 A. L. R. 927. Cf. Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282
U. S. 66o, 51 Sup. Ct. 286, 75 L. Ed. 602 (1930). On the relation of equity to
tort law, see Chafee, Does Equity Follow the Law of Torts? (1926) 751U. oF PA. L.
REv. i. That discretion still plays its part in the courts, see Winfield, Ethics in
English Case Law (193I) 45 HARv. L. REv. 112, 129.
saPouND, LAW AND MORALS (1923) 32 et seg., 58; I SPENCE, op. cit. note 2,
at 713; 1 HoLDswoRTH, op. cit. note 2, at 465 et seg. Cf. MAITLAND, op. cit. note
143, at i, who says: "Equity now is that body of rules administered by our English
courts of justice which, were it not for the operation of the Judicature Acts,
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The Ordinary or Common Law Jurisdiction of ChanceryHB
The chancellor's ordinary or common law jurisdiction, aside from
his functions as administrative head of the writ office, was not
definitely distinguished from the equity jurisdiction until late in the
fifteenth century. 7 This branch of Chancery was called the Latin
Side because it employed the common law system of pleading, which
was in Latin, and its records were enrolled on parchment as were those
of the common law courts. The equity jurisdiction, on the other hand,
was known as the "French Side", orlater the "English Side", since the
bill by which a cause was there commenced was usually written in
French, the language of the royal court, until the reign of Henry V
(1413-i422), when the ancient but previously infrequent "English bill"
came into general use.28 Latin remained not only the language of
the common law procedure but also of the decrees and other formal
documents in equity, though not for the pleadings therein, until
English was substituted by statute for all court proceedings in 1731 .29
would be administered only by those courts which would be known as Courts of
Equity." Also cf. In re Telescriptor Syndicate, 11903] 2 Ch. i74, at 195, Buckley,
J.; Pierpont v. Fowle, i9 Fed. Cas. 652, 658 (1846); Johnson v. U. S. Rys. Co.,
227 Mo. 423, 450, 127 S. W. 63, 71 (i9io).
211 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 452; I SPENCE, op. cit. note 2, at 336;
Spence, op. cit. note I85, at 234; COKE, op. cit. note 7, at 79; 3 BLACKSTONE, Op.
cit. note 23, at 47 et seg.; I MADDOCK, Henry, THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF
THE HIGH COURT OF CHANCERY (1817) Chapter I; Keigwin, op. cit. note x85, at
97; WALSH, op. cit. note 185, at 14.
271 HoLDswoRTH, op. cit. note 2, at 451. Cf. I ibid. 400.
2SBAILDON, op. cit. note 193, at xiii; 2 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 48o; I
SPENCE, op. cit. note 2, at 348; Spence, op. cit. note 185, at 249.
2994 GEO. II, c. 26 (1731). This reform would seem to have been at least a
century late, to judge from Professor Winfield's account of the breakdown of
the old formal languages as exhibited by a writer of 1631, who described how "a
prisoner on his trial 'jecte un graund brickbat que narrowly mist' the head of the
judge." Indeed, the Commonwealth had enacted a similar statute in 165o,
which was repudiated on the restoration of Charles II (i66o). WINFIELD, Percy
H., CHIEF SOURCES OF ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY (1925) 7 et seq.
It is an interesting commentary on the conservatism of the legal profession
that the common law reports were not written in English until approximately
the time of Coke, which was two centuries after Geoffrey Chaucer (134o-I4OO)
began to write English poetry and John Wyclif (c. 1324-1384) translated the
Bible into English, and that Latin persisted as the language of formal legal records
and documents for still another century. 5 HoLDswoRTH, op. cit. note 2, at 159
Ct seq.; I POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, op. cit. note 2, at 8o et seg.
CRoss, op. cit. note 49, at 201, 699. At page 201, he says: "In 1363 the Chan-
cellor opened Parliament with a speech in English. In the previous year it had
been enacted that English should be the language of the law courts, for the
reason that the 'people have no knowledge nor understanding of that which is
218 .
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The writ issuing function of Chancery, although usually classified
as within the ordinary or common law jurisdiction, was purely ad-
ministrative, as compared with the judicial functions exercised under
that jurisdiction on proceedings commenced otherwise than by bill.20
It would seem that the chancellor also issued the writ of Habeas
Corpus and certain other prerogative writs when the common law
courts were in vacation.?' By the famous series of Habeas Corpus
Acts of 1641, 1679 and i816, the chancellor as well as the three
superior courts of common law was empowered to issue this writ
either in term time or vacation.22 Since all civil matters affecting the
king's interest fell within this jurisdiction of Chancery, the king
could sue in Chancery or in the common law courts as he preferred,
even though the cause was one which would ordinarily fall exclusively
within the jurisdiction of the latter courts. 3 The ordinary jurisdic-
said for or against ther'-and that the court records should be in Latin. As a
matter of fact, however, cases continued to be argued and reported in French
till the eighteenth century; the language of the statutes was French till Henry
VII; and Latin did not cease to be the language of writs, charters, and records
until 1731."
In 2 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 479 et seg., it is said: "Latin was the legal
language of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. It was therefore the official lan-
guage of those branches of the Curia Regis, such as the Chancery and the courts
of common law, which had begun to keep plea rolls at this period. The custom of
an office or a department upon a matter of second rate importance, such as the
language used in making up a record, is perhaps the most conservative thing on
earth. Hence we find that these records continued to be drawn up in Latin until
1731." Cf.ibid.48o. Seeinfranote249.
nOPike, L. Owen, Common Law and Conscience in the Ancient Court of Chancery,
2 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLo-AmERIcAN LEGAL HISTORY (1908) 722.
23There was long a dispute as to whether the chancellor possessed this power.
COKE, op. cit. note 7, at 81, conceded that the chancellor could issue the writ of
habeas corpus either in vacation or term time of the King's Bench. 2 HALE,
PLEAS OF THE CROWN (first published in 1736, 1st Am. ed. 1847) 145, considered
the power limited to vacation. The famous Lord Chancellor Nottingham held
for political reasons in Jenkes's Case (1676), 6 HOWELL'S STATE TRIALS (1816)
119o, 1191 that there was no precedent justifying his issuing the writ in vacation.
However, Lord Eldon, after an extensive review of the authorities, overruled
that decision in Crowley's Case, 2 Swanston's Rep. 1, 65 (I818). And see: 9
HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 116; 3 BLACKSTONE, Op. cit. note 23, at 132;
INDERWicK, op. cit. note 121, at 1I4; MADDOCK, op. cit. note 226, at 12.
2nI HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 228.
2131 HOLDSWORTH, Op. cit. note 2, at 453; I SPENCE, op. cit. note 2, at 337;
Spence, op. cit. note 185, at 235. For a general discussion of the common law
side of Chancery, see I HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 452; 1 SPENCE, Op. Cit.
note 2, at 336 et seg.; Spence, op. cit. note 185, at 234 et seg.; MAITLAND, op.
cit. note 143, at 4; 3 BLACKSTONE, op. cit. note 23, at 47 et seg.; COKE, op. cit. note
7, at 79.
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tion also covered the trial of cases involving ministers and officers of
the royal court; the holding of pleas upon scire facias (order to show
cause) for the repeal or cancellation of the king's letters-patent; and
petitions of right and inquests of office where the king had been put
in possession of lands or goods in prejudice of the subject's right.
The process employed on the Latin side of Chancery was usually
that of the common law, that is, by writ rather than by bill.24 The
restrictions of the Statute of Westminster II did not apply to actions
instituted by the king on the common law side of his Court of Chan-
cery.25 When exercising his ordinary jurisdiction, the chancellor
sat as a judge administering the common law. Since he possessed no
power of summoning a jury into his court, all disputes of fact which,
under the common law procedure, would entitle the defendant to
trial by jury had to be sent to the King's Bench for trial and judgment
therein.2 6 The chancellor was not permitted to resort to his extra-
=Barbour, Some Aspects of Fifteenth Century Chancery (1918) 31 HARv. L.
REV. 834, 841n., says: "There was a common-law side to the Court of Chancery
of which a familiar account is given by Coke, 4 Inst. Cap. viii, 79. For the most
part the proceedings were begun by common-law process, and it is generally
agreed that in the exercise of this jurisdiction the Chancellor followed the law
and could not advert to matters of conscience. Since Pike published the case of
Hals v. Hyncley, I L. Quart. Rev. 443, it has been known that these proceedings
sometimes began by bill, and that the defendant was brought into court by
subpoena. Hence one must always be on one's guard; for a petition in the Early
Chancery Proceedings may involve a case on the common-law side of the court."
And see: I SPENCE, op. cit. note 2, at 337; Spence, op. cit. note 185, at 235.
2sThe distinction between the issuance of writs to the subject and those con-
cerning the king's interest led to a distinction in the place where the respective
types of writs were kept. Those for the subject having been originally kept in a
hamper (in hanaperio) came to be issued at the Hanaper Office, while those
affecting the royal interests having been formerly kept in a little bag were issued
by the Petty Bag Office, and a judgment on the Common Law side was known
as a judgment in the Petty Bag. 3 BLACKSTONE, op. cit. note 23, at 49; TouT,
op. cit. note 124, at 59; MADDOCK, op. cit. note 226, at 3.
See the Act of ii & 12 VICT., c. 94 (1848), regulating certain positions in the
office of the Petty Bag of the High Court of Chancery, and providing that most
writs issued out of the Petty Bag and formerly sealed with the Great Seal should
thereafter be sealed with the Chancery Common Law Seal, the same as writs out
of the Hanaper. See amending Act of 12 & 13 VICT., c. IO9 (1849). And see
Pike, op. cit. note 230, at 722-724.
2
"CHITTY, Joseph, GENERAL PRACTICE (1835) 406; I SPENCE, op. cit. note 2,
at 337; Spence, op. cit. note 185, at 235; 3 BLACKSTONE, op. Cit. note 23, at 48;
COKE, op. cit. note 7, at 8o; MAITLAND, op. cit. note 143, at 4; MADDOCK, Op.
cit. note 226, at 3.
The situation described in the text must be distinguished from those cases
within the chancellor's extraordinary jurisdiction in which an issue of fact arose
of such a nature that it could be readily determined by a common law jury but
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ordinary jurisdiction when sitting on the common law side of his
court.2 7 The judicial activities of the common law side of Chancery,
as distinguished from its administrative functions, were so over-
shadowed by the equitable duties of the chancellor that Blackstone
reports that in his day this jurisdiction was practically obsolete.2'8
A visitatorial jurisdiction over charitable foundations of the crown,
and over those private charities for which no visitor had been ap-
pointed or existed, was vested in the chancellor, as the king's repre-
sentative. He exercised this jurisdiction by issuing.a commission to
certain persons to inquire into the management of such charities2sa
The Later History of Chancery
The increasing prominence of Chancery in the judicial system in
the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries brought upon it a struggle for
existence. It had a procedure of its own which, in addition to being
very efficient, was simpler and less expensive than that of the common
law, and it thus attracted many suitors from the common law
courts.29 Moreover, its character as a court of conscience often
brought it into direct contradiction with the strict rules of the com-
mon law. Near the end of the fifteenth century the chancellor began
which, because of the number of witnesses and conflict of testimony, did not lend
itself to trial by written depositions, as was customary in Chancery. The chan-
cellor then framed an issue of fact which was sent to the King's Bench or to the
Assizes for trial before a common law jury, which rendered an advisory verdict.
This was transmitted to the chancellor and, if approved by him, he entered a
regular decree in equity in accord with the findings of the jury. McCasklll,
Oliver Le Roy, Actions and Causes of Action (1925) 34 YALE L. J. 627; 3 BLACK-
STONE, op. cit. note 23, at 452.
But by statute, 12 & 13 VICr., c. lO9 (1849), regulating procedure on the
common law side of Chancery, it was provided that any issue of law or fact
arising on that side "shall or may be" sent to one of the three superior courts
of the common law for trial.
2I SPENCE, op. cit. note 2, at 337; KERLY, op. cit. note 192, at 55.
283 BLACKSTONE, op. cit. note 23, at 48; I HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 452;
POTTER, op. cit. note go, at 227. Cf. 2 CHITTY, op. cit. note 236, at 407.
21saI BLACKSTONE, Op. cit. note 23 (Lewis' ed. 1902) 484n.; 2 MADDOCK, op. Cit.
note 226, at 58; I SPENCE, op. cit. note 2, at 336; Spence, op. cit. note 185, at 234.
See note to Sutton's Hospital Case (1613), IO COKE'S REP. (Fraser's ed. 1826)
253, at 300. Cf. powers of the Justices of the Peace relating to public charities,
supra. I BLACKSTONE, op. cit. note 23, at 481, mentions the visitatorial juris-
diction of the King's Bench over civil corporations.
2
"'PLUCKNETT, op. cit. note 5, at 242; I HoLDswORTH, Op. cit. note 2, at 458; 5
ibid. 278; PouND, op. cit. note 142, at 72; MAITLAND, op. cit. note 143, at 6;
BAILDON, op. cit. note 193, at xxi; POLLOCK, op. cit. note 170, at 191. Cf. PARKES,
op. cit. note 170, at 37 et seq.
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to enjoin parties from maintaining actions in the law courts, or from
setting up defenses at law which he considered inequitable.20 It
will be noted that he did not undertake to issue writs of prohibition
directly against the law courts, as he sometimes did against the ec-
clesiastical courts, but achieved a like result by enjoining plaintiffs
from bringing or maintaining actions therein.N1 Although the com-
mon law judges had lent their aid to the development of the chancel-
lor's jurisdiction during its infancy, when its popularity and its ag-
gressiveness began to threaten the original supremacy of their courts,
they turned upon it in defense of their own jurisdiction. The great
and good common lawyer, Sir Thomas More, Lord Chancellor (1529-
1532), who was appointed by Henry VIII (509-1547) following the
downfall of Cardinal Wolsey, did much to reconcile the aggrieved
lawyers.m Early in the seventeenth century, however, the conflict
was bitterly renewed by Lord Chief Justice Coke, champion of the
common law, and Lord Chancellor Ellesmere (16o3-i6I7) defender
of equity.23 So intense became the struggle that by 1616 the adminis-
tration of civil justice was brought almost to a standstill. At this
juncture, the chancellor appealed to King James I (16o3-i625). The
king referred the question to a committee of five, composed of the
celebrated Sir Francis Bacon, Attorney General and later Lord
Chancellor (1617-1621), and other learned counsel. The committee
found for the chancellor on the specific problem: whether the chancel-
lor could give relief after or against a judgment at common law.
Thereupon the king gave his judgment ratifying and confirming "the
ancient and continued practice and presidency of our Chancery.
' 2"
240See Lord Ellesmere's decision in the Earl of Oxford's Case, I Ch. Rep. I
(1615), s. c. BoKE, George H., CASES IN EQUITY (American Casebook Series,
1918) 8, 1 WHITE AND TUDoR, LEADING CASES IN EQUITY (9th ed. 1928) 615. I
HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 459.
mMAITLAND, op. cit. note 143, at 9; CARTER, op. cit. note 68, at 95 et seg. The
chancellor could remove a case properly within the exclusive jurisdiction of
equity from a common law court by writ of certiorari. MiTFORD AND TYLER,
PLEADINGS AND PRACTIcE IN EQUITY (1876) Io6.
2PLUCKNETT, op. cit. note 5, at 240; 5 HOLDSWORTH, Op. cit. note 2, at 233-234;
KERLY, op. cit. note 192, at 96.
203 BLACKSTONE, op. cit. note 23, at 53; PARKES, op. cit. note 170, at 80; 1
HoLDSwoRTH, op. cit. note 2, at 459 et seg.; MAITLAND, op. cit. note 143, at Io;
PLUCKNETT, op. cit. note 5, at 242, 248. Although the crisis occurred during
Coke's Chief Justiceship of the King's Bench (1613-1616), he had earlier issued
writs of prohibition against the prerogative courts when he was Chief Justice of
the Common Pleas (16o6-1613). Indeed, the Court of Common Pleas had begun
to issue writs of prohibition against the Court of Requests as early as I59O. I
HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 415; BAILDON, op. cit. note 193, at xxxvii. See
note 142, supra. 244 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 463n.
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This vindication of Chancery perpetuated the dual system of courts
of law and courts of equity peculiar to our English heritage, for,
although the common lawyers renewed their claims in the revolu-
tionary crises later in the century,25 the ruling was never reversed.
With its place in the judicial system firmly established, Chancery
resumed its progress. For a time it maintained its efficiency and repu-
tation. Unlike the common law courts, which functioned only in the
regular court terms, the chancellor's court was always open since the
king's equity must be ever available to his subjects.246 There was no
charge for filing a petition or bill in Chancery because in theory one
prayed for relief as a suppliant to whom the ordinary justice had been
denied or because the remedies afforded by the ordinary courts were
inadequate. 47 A subpoena was served upon the defendant, directing
him to appear under penalty of a fine and answer upon oath the
complainant's bill.2S The chancellor heard the case without a jury
2
"MAITLAND, op. Cit. note 143, at io; I HOLDSWORTH, op. ct. note 2, at 463
et seq.2 46CoKE, op. cit. note 7, at 81; INDERwicK, op. Cit. note 121, at 114; I HOLDS-
WORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 4o8.
The common law courts sat in four sessions or terms annually: the Hilary
term, held in January; the Easter term, held in April and May; the Trinity term,
held in May and June; the Michaelmas term, held in October and November.
The terms were originally timed by the church festivals from which they took
their names. The Judicature Act of 1873 abolished the ancient terms, and pro-
vided that the courts should sit at all times except during such vacations as
should be fixed by order of the crown in council. By Order 63 the courts sit four
times a year under the old names, but usually for somewhat longer periods, e. g.,
"Michaelmas Sittings" from October x2th to December 21st. See ENGLISH
ANNUAL PRACTICE, or "White Book", (1930) 1318.
247LEADAm AND BALDWIN, op. cit. note 185, at xxxvi; I SPENCE, op. cit. note 2,
at 368.
The poverty of the plaintiff was often the cause for his suing in Chancery. The
early petitions usually concluded "for God and in the way of charity". BAILDON,
op. cit. note 193, at xxiii, 47.
But costs might be awarded against the plaintiff in the discretion of Chancery.
2 MADDOCK, op. cit. note 226, at 416; I HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 4o3.
The bill was not required to be supported by the complainant's oath, but he
might be required to give pledges for the prosecution, i. e., to secure payment of
costs and to make amends to the defendant if the complaint was unfounded.
BAILDON, op. cit. note 193, at xxv; MADDOCK, op. cit. note 226, at 216; 5 HOLDS-
WORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 285. On the nature of the bill, see 9 HOLDSWORTH, op.
cit. note 2, at 335, 376 et seq.
A suit in Chancery by the crown, or one suing under the protection of the
crown, was begun by information filed by the king's Attorney General or Solicitor
General. MiTFOP , John (Lord Redesdale), CHANCERY PLEADINGS (6th Am.
ed. 1849) 22, 119; 2 MADDOCK, op. cit. note 226, at 135.
24&The Chancery process takes its name from the words "sub poena" (under
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and decided all issues both of law and fact. His decision of causes
within the equitable jurisdiction was by "decree", so called because it
sounded in terms of command, "decretum est".249 The relief in equity
not only fitted the needs of the specific case, but, as previously pointed
out, was supported by the superior sanction of imprisonment of a
recalcitrant defendant for contempt of the prerogative command.2 0
But on the common law side the chancellor's decision took the form
of a common law judgment: "ideo consideratum est per curiam" (there-
fore it is considered by the court)2sl that the plaintiff recover the ap-
propriate legal relief, or if the judgment was for the defendant "quod
eat sine die" (that he go without day). 22 This impersonal style was
employed to indicate that the common law judge, or chancello when
sitting on the Latin side, merely acted as the oracle of the law in an-
nouncing its judgment, whereas by his decree in equity the chancellor
laid his personal command upon the defendant.
It was the popularity of the extraordinary jurisdiction of Chancery
under the Tudors which sowed the seeds of its decay. In spite of the
penalty). This name is also applied to the writ by which a witness is notified to
appear and testify in a law suit. PLUCKNETT, op. cit. note 5, at 237; BAILDON, op.
cit. note 193, at xiv; KERLY, op. cit. note 192, at ii9; LEADAM AND BALDWIN,
op. cit. note I85, at xxix.
249For an example of such a decree see Abbot of Shrewsbury v. Bailiffs of Shrews-
bury (15o4), in LEADAm, I. S., SELECT CASES IN THE STAR CHAMIBER (16 Selden
Society, 1902) 178. The report reads that the Lord Chancellor, and certain
members of the council "decreuerunt ef adiudicarunt...Et eciam decretum est."
CARTER, op. cit. note 68, at 95, gives another early form of the decree as "per
decretum cancellarii", etc. Also see, I SPENCE, op. cit. note 2, at 389 et seg.
That the above illustration from a Star Chamber case is not inappropriate, see
DICEY, op. cit. note 193, at 70: "Indeed there is little reason to suppose that in the
fifteenth century persons brought before the Council and those summoned to
the presence of the Chancellor came before an essentially different court."
Other examples of early proceedings in Chancery from Richard II to Elizabeth
will be found in I CALENDAR OF PROCEEDINGS IN CHANCERY IN REIGN OF QUEEN
ELIZABETH (1827), reviewed at length in (1828) I THE JURIST 327.
2oSee supra note 218.
reForms of judgments delivered by the chancellor on the common law side of
his court are given by Pike, op. cit. note 23o, at 724. That early decisions even
in the equity side were commonly expressed in language much like the common
law judgment, see BAILDON, op. cit. note 193, at 158; LEADAM AND BALDWIN, op.
cit. note 185, at 77. On the form of the common law judgment in general, see 3
BLACKSTONE, op. cit. note 23, at 316, 396; STEPHEN, op. cit. note 42 (Williston's
ed. 1895, based on the 5th English edition, 1843) 125; PERRY, Op. cit- note 156, at
216 et seg.
nzThe dismissal of the defendant was expressed in this quaint language because,
after his appearance in answer to service of process at the commencement of the
action, each time he was permitted to depart from the court he was ordered to
return on a specified day. 3 BLACKSTONE, Op. cit. note 23, at 316.
224D
ANGLO-AMERICAN JUDICIAL SYSTEM
liberalization of the common law courts in the extension of the action
on the case and the development of the new actions of assumpsit,
Chancery was swamped with causes. As its functions gradually
changed from those of a purely executive tribunal and took on more
of the characteristics of a judicial tribunal, the chancellor became
more and more hampered in the expedition of its businessSH In
consequence, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries it took so
long to get a case through Chancery, and the costs of the innumer-
able copies of the papers, devised to enable the multitude of clerks of
Chancery to make a handsome living, were so exorbitant that the
court became a by-word for procrastination, extortion and injustice.
The hardship was accentuated by the operation of the maxim that
once equity took jurisdiction it would give complete relief, for there-
after, no matter how great the delay, all phases of the case, including
those which standing alone could have been sued on in the common
law courts, were irretrievably at the mercy of the Chancery pro-
cedure.2
The decline of Chancery reached its lowest point about 1827 when
Lord Lyndhurst (Chancellor, 1827-1830) succeeded the celebrated
Lord Eldon. The latter, in spite of his renown in the development of
the jurisprudence of equity, had been too busy with the political side
of his office to maintain an efficient Chancery procedure."' 5 This
was the time and setting of the famous case of Jarndyce v. Jarndyce,
so vividly reported by Charles Dickens in "Bleak House." 56 While
Dickens is commonly credited with having aroused public opinion
=The twentieth century is witnessing again an attempt to substitute for
judicial justice, legal or equitable, new types of executive and administrative
tribunals providing a less technical and more expeditious justice, such as the
Public Service Commission, the Workmen's Compensation Board, etc. POUND,
op. cit. note 142, at 7; Pound, Executive Justice (1907) 55 Am. L. PEG. 137.
264PARKEs, op. cit. note 170, supplies many interesting details of its abuses.
This book was reviewed at length in (1828) I THE JURIST 446. 9 HOLDSWORTH,
op. cit. note 2, at 339 et seq.
25 HoLDswORTH, CHARLES DICKENS AS A LEGAL HISTORIAN (1928) 79; KERLY,
op. cit. note 192, at 271 et seg.; PARKES, op. cit. note 570, Preface and 351 et seq.;
PLUCKNETT, op. cit. note 5, at 257 et seg.; I Foss, Edward, MEMORIES OF WEST-
MINSTER HALL (1874) 1I0.2
"Professor Holdsworth reminds us in his delightful little book (op. cit. note 255,
at 9) that Dickens had been a clerk in law offices as a mere youth and at eighteen
was a reporter in Doctor's Commons and in Lord Lyndhurst's Court.
Although Jarndyce v. Jarndyce is a fictitious case, Professor Holdsworth says
(page 81): "In fact, I am sure that it would be possible to produce an edition of
Bleak House, in which all Dickens' statements could be verified by the state-
ments of the witnesses who gave evidence before the Chancery Commission,
which reported in 1826."
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and thus brought about the reform in Chancery which ensued, the
fact is that the progressive elements of bench and bar in England,
under the leadership of Lord Brougham (1830-1834), had done much
to improve Chancery procedure before the appearance of "Bleak
House" as a serial in 1852-1853 .251 7 By 1831 the bankruptcy jurisdiction
of Chancery had been vested in a separate tribunal; by 1833 the
Masters were put on salaries andfees were regulated; by 1842 the Six
and Sixty Clerks, together with a multitude of other useless officials,
were abolished; and in 1852, simultaneously with the serial publica-
tion of "Bleak House", three Chancery reform statutes258 were passed
which not only abolished the Masters in Chancery and the old fee
system entirely, but made many improvements in pleading and
evidence in Chancery cases. There is no doubt, however, that the
novels of Dickens played an important role in bringing about the
entirely new system of English courts, administering both law and
equity, established by the Judicature Acts of I873-875" 9
Personnel of Chancery
As we have seen, the early chancellors were generally high ec-
clesiastics. The greatest exception to that rule was when Henry III
in 1253, on the eve of his departure to one of his wars in France,
made his beautiful and able Queen, Eleanor of Provence, Lady Keeper
of the Great Seal, and she in person administered the extraordinary
jurisdiction as a judge of the Curia Regis.26 With the downfall of
the ancient church in the sixteenth century began the appointment of
laymen, usually common lawyers, to the chancellorship. The last of
the ecclesiastical chancellors was Bishop John Williams (1621-
1625 ), 21 and the last lay chancellor who was unlearned in the common
57'HoLDSWORTH, op. Cit. note 255, at 79 et seg., 113; GEST, John Marshall,
THE LAWYER IN LITERATURE (1913) 28 et seq.
25815 & 16 VICT., cc. 80, 86, 87 (1852).
21I HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 443; 9 ibid. 375; KERLY, op. cit. note 192, at
271 et seg.; Bowen, Lord, Progress in the Administration of Justice During the
Victorian Period (1887), I SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLo-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY
(1907) 516, 523 et seq.
But to the men of the time these reforms came slowly. Lord Bowen, page 529,
quotes Spence: "No man, as things now stand, can enter into a Chancery suit
with any reasonable hope of being alive at its termination, if he has a determined
adversary." Also see HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 255, at 113.
2601 CAMiPBELL, op. cit. note 191, at 123.261 INDERWICK, op. cit. note 121, at 182; PARKES, op. cit. note 17O, at 93; 5
HoLDswoRTH, op. cit. note 2, at 218 et seq., 226.
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law was Anthony Ashley Cooper, first Earl of Shaftesbury, a notorious
politician, who held office x672-i673.62
Until approximately the last half-century of theWestminster epoch,
Chancery was essentially a one judge court. True, from very early
times there was a Clerk or Keeper of the Rolls of Chancery, who later
came to be known as the Master of the Rolls.23 He was chief of the
twelve Masters in Chancery,M and, until the time of Henry VIII, was
regarded merely as the chancellor's assistant, empowered to act as
judge only when the chancellor was absent or incapacitated. The
Master of the Rolls became a distinct but subordinate Chancery
judge about 1525 during the chancellorship of Cardinal Wolsey,
1515-,529. His decisions were appealable to the chancellor.2 65 This
organization of Chancery, consisting of the chancellor, the Master of
the Rolls, the Masters in Chancery and the Six Clerks and their
sixty subordinate clerks, did the work of but a single judge, since the
Master of the Rolls sat when the chancellor was not sitting and for the
hearing of equity causes only.266
It was not until 1813 that provision was made for a vice-chancellor
to assist in the disposition of Chancery cases.2 17 With the dawn of the
industrial age a century ago, the need for efficiency and expedition in
Chancery procedure led to an imperative demand for increased
2'23 CAMPBELL, op. cit. note 143, at 289; I HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 411.2
uToTi, op. cit. note 124, at 59, 328, adds that by modem legislation the
authority of the Master of the Rolls has been extended to the custody of all
the records of the crown. Some writers have said that Edward I appointed a
Master of the Rolls in 1295: I SPENCE, Op. cit. note 2, at 358n. (a); KERLy, op. cit.
note 192, at 27, 6o. But i HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 417 et seq., in dis-
cussing the origin of the office, does not mention this date. I CAMPBELL, Op.
cit. note 191, at I51, mentions that in 129 o the Master of the Rolls was fined Iooo
marks for taking bribes.
2For an account of the Masters in Chancery see: I SPENCE, op. cit. note 2, at
238; Maisters of the Chauncerie, written by an anonymous Master in Chancery
in the last years of the sixteenth century, and reprinted in HARGRAVE'S LAW
TRACTS (1787) 293 et seg.; KERLY, op. cit. note 192, at 59; I HOLDSWORTH, Op. Cit.
note 2, at 417 et seg.; 3 BLACKSTONE, op. cit. note 23 (Lewis' ed.) at 55. The
Masters in Chancery were chiefly doctors of the Civil (Roman) Law until after
the Puritan Revolution. 5 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 257 et seq.
26The judicial position of the Master of the Rolls as the general deputy of the
Chancellor was settled by Act of 3 GEo. II, c. 30 (1729). 1 HOLDSWORTH, op.
cit. note 2, at 419; PLUCKNETT, op. cit. note 5, at 242n.; i KXERLY, op. cit. note 192,
at 6o, 127; CARTER, op. cit. note 68, at 97.
266KERLY, Op. cit. note 192, at 127; I Foss, op. cit. note 255, at III.
267PARKES, op. cit. note 170, at 356 et seq. Sir Thomas Plumer became the first
vice-chancellor of England in 1814. He was succeeded in 1818 by Sir John
Leach, who became Master of the Rolls in x827. 7 CAMPBELL, op. cit. note 143,
at 303, 328.
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personnel on the Chancery bench. As a first resort the Master of the
Rolls was empowered in 1833 to sit daily to hear motions and to con-
duct any of the work of the court instead of being limited to the hear-
ing of equity cases as of old. In 1841 two additional vice-chancellors
were appointed. Still, as farsighted men had predicted before the
appointment of the first vice-chancellor,26 the sole appellate jurisdic-
tion vested in the chancellor continued to obstruct the administration
of equity. To correct this defect a Court of Appeal in Chancery was
created in i851, consisting of two Lords Justices of Appeal and the
chancellor, if he cared to sit. When the old High Court of Chancery
was abolished by the Judicature Act of 1873, the Lord Chancellor
and six subordinates were performing its judicial functions.2 9 By
this act Chancery was merged into the new English judicature sys-
tem as the Chancery Division of the High Court of Justice.
270
Courts of Chancery were established in all the American colonies,2 7'
but in Massachusetts and Pennsylvania the discretionary jurisdic-
tion of the chancellor was so repugnant to the puritanical concept of a
justice of law and not of men 72 that those colonies early rejected
both the court and its equitable jurisdiction.273 Today, all American
jurisdictions recognize equity as a fundamental element in their
jural system,27 4 although but seven states retain the separate
268PARKES, op. cit. note 170, at 357.
2191 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 443; MAITLAND, op. cit. note 143, at 14;
Bowen, op. cit. note 259, at 533 et seq.; IK(EY, op. cit. note 192, at 275 et seg.;
CARTER, op. cit. note 68, at 97. 2 70MAITLAND, op. cit. note 143, at 15.
2nWilson, Solon Dyke, Courts of Chancery in the American Colonies, 2 SELECT
ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY (1908) 779.
2"POUND, op. cit. note 142, at 51, 53 et set.
2"'The courts in these colonies attempted to administer equitable principles
through common law courts and procedure. Not until 1836 and 1877 did Penn-
sylvania and Massachusetts adopt an equity jurisdiction by statute. Woodruff,
Edwin H., Chancery in Massachusetts (1889) 5 L. Q. REv. 370, reprinted and
brought down to 1929, 9 B. U. L. REv. 168; Fisher, Sidney George, Adminis-
tration of Equity Through Common Law Forms in Pennsylvania (1895), 2 SELECT
ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERicAN LEGAL HISTORY (1908) 8IO. HAwKiNS, op. cit.
note 170, at 9 et seg.
274Even before the famous Pennsylvania Equity Act of June 13, 1836 (P. L.
789), Chief Justice John Bannister Gibson said: "Equity is a part of our law;
and I would just as willingly disturb the foundations of our common law, laid in
the time of Lord Coke, as shake a principle of equity settled by Lord Talbot,
Hardwicke, or Northington [Nottingham].. .As we cannot hope to see a separate
administration of equity, we are bound to introduce it into our system as copi-
ously as our limited powers will admit." The Case of Torr's Estate, 2 Rawle
250, 253 (Pa. 1830). Cf. Hogsett v. Thompson, 258 Pa. 85, ioi Atl. 941 (1917),
which denied the right of a court to appoint a receiver for an individual on the
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Chancery courts.2 7 5 Not only are law and equity administered in the
same courts in most American states, but the majority of those juris-
dictions have followed the lead of the New York Code of Procedure of
1849 in attempting to merge legal and equitable forms of pleading and
procedure. Many distinctions still prevail, however, as to right of
jury trial, the nature of the substantive principles applied, and the
type of relief granted.
THE HIGH COURT OF STAR CHAMBER
The High Court of Star Chamber (Camera St-ellata), as it was com-
monly known from the name of the hall in the palace at Westminster
in which it usually sat,276 was simply the king and his council func-
tioning primarily as a judicial body.27  It has been well termed the
ground that "the courts of Pennsylvania do not possess general Chancery powers,
but exercise only such as have been conferred upon them by statute."
275Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Mississippi, New Jersey, Tennessee, and
Vermont. In Vermont the same persons who sit as chancellors in the court of
equity sit as judges in the common law courts. CLARK, Charles E., HANDBOOK
OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING (1928) 47n. Cf. WALSH, op. cit. note 185, at 39.
Maryland has a separate Court of Equity in the City of Baltimore. Reiblich,
Study of Judicial Administration in Maryland (1929) JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY
STUDIES, Series 47, No. 2. New York until 1846 had a separate Court of Chan-
cery, on which sat thefamous ChancellorJames Kent during the years 1814-1823.
276"Camera Stellata" or "Chamber of Stars". The best explanation of the
derivation of the name of the court appears in BALDWIN, op. cit. note 50, at 355-
356. He states that a new building for the special use of the Council was erected
about 1345 by Edward III (1326-1377) upon the river front next to the Exchequer
within the palace grounds at Westminster, and adds: "The name 'star chamber'
also appears from the very start, although for many years it was more commonly
known as 'the council chamber next to the receipt of the exchequer.'... One is
bound, therefore, to accept the simple and obvious meaning as was suggested
long ago by Stow, that the star chamber was so called because its ceiling was deco-
rated with stars..." Also see: CARTER, op. cit. note 68, at 78; 1 HOLDSWORTH,
op. cit. note 2, at 496; Scofield, Cora L., A Study of the Court of Star Chamber, 2
UNIV. OF CHICAGO DISSERTATIONS (i900) I.
Pollard, A. F., Council, Star Chamber and Privy Council under the Tudors-I.,
The Star Chamber (1922) 37 ENG. HIST. REV. 516, states that the famous old
Star Chamber was destroyed in the great fire of 1834; and INDERWIcK, op. cit.
note 121, at 172, writing in I89O, says that its site was then occupied by the
Speaker's house.
27 7There was no sharp differentiation between the functions of the Council
when sitting in the Star Chamber and its broad powers as a governing body.
It was this failure to sever itself completely from its ancient political functions
which eventually caused its downfall. LEan AND BALDWIN, op. cit. note 185,
at xvi; LEADAtI, op. cit. note 249, at xi, xlii et seg.; Hudson, op. cit. note 182,
at i-24o; I HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 492 et seq.; 5 ibid. 155; BALDWIN, Op.
cit. note 5o, at 442; 4 REEVES, op. cit. note io5, at 146 et seq.; INDERWICK, Op. Cit.
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
"Court of Criminal Equity", "twin sister of the Court of Chan-
cery",278 since it, too, was an executive court exercising most of the
extraordinary jurisdiction of the prerogative of grace remaining after
the branching off of Chancery.27 9 It dealt chiefly with those bills and
petitions involving the due administration of justice and the main-
tenance of the public peace.280
The need for such a court arose from the social disorganization of
the realm incident to the Wars of the Roses. So serious had become
the breakdown of law and order that two years before the outbreak
of those wars,28' Parliament, alarmed by Cade's Rebellion, desisted
from its long policy of resistance to the growing power of the Council
and, in 1453, passed the Act of 31 Henry VI (1422-1461) c. 2. This
act accorded the first statutory recognition to the summary procedure
of the Council based upon its ancient jurisdiction in dealing with
such flagrant breaches of the peace as great riots, extortions and op-
pressions. The statute proved ineffectual to restore order amid the
clash of arms which ensued, and it terminated in 1461 by its own time
limitation of seven years.2 82
When Henry VII (1485-x 509), first of the Tudors, emerged as King
of England at the close of these long civil wars, he faced much the
same problem of establishing law and order that had confronted the
great Henry II (1154-Ii89), first of the Plantagenets. He found his
country in chaos. The common law and the common law courts by
which Henry II had made supreme the king's peace throughout the
realm had proved impotent to protect life and property when the
royal power weakened. The people again turned to the prerogative
justice, petitioning king and Council for protection and redress
note 121, at 169; I HALLAM, Henry, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND
(6th ed. r85o) 50, 54n.
2781 MAITLAND, op. cit. note II, at 8o, A Historical Sketch of Liberty and Equal-
ity; I ibid. 490, Outlines of English History; MAITLAND, op. cit. note 143, at 2o.
And see: ADAMS, op. cit. note 174, at 249; PALGRAVE, op. cit. note ioo, at 4; HALE,
Sir Matthew, HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND (Runnington's ed.
1820) 2on.
27PSee supra note 182.
28 0PLUCKNETT, op. cit. note 5, at i4o; 5 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 255 et
seq.; DICEY, op. cit. note 193, at 68 et seq.; 4 REEVES, op. cit. note io5, at 147
el seq.; I SPENCE, op. cit. note 2, at 350.
281The Wars of the Roses began with the battle of St. Albans, May, 2455. For
a picture of the general confusion existing at the outbreak of the civil wars, see
DICEY, op. cit. note 193, at 74; 3 STUBBS, op. cit. note 5, at 548 et seq.; and author-
ities cited in note 283, infra.
2821 LEADAm, op. cit. note 249, at Ix et seg., stresses the importance of this act in
defining some of the ancient jurisdiction of the Council and thus in later years
of the Star Chamber.
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against the superior might that overawed the general courts and made
trial by jury a travesty on justice.2 1 To meet this need, it was im-
perative that part of the Council should sit permanently at West-
minster to hear these petitions and render a speedy and efficient
relief. A committee of the Council was, therefore, empowered to act
in this capacity.2 That the forces of law and order might present a
united front against the marauding barons and bandits, Parliament
renewed its support of the authority of the Council by passing in
1487 the famous statute known as "Pro Camera Stellata",285 which
2'For an excellent description of the social condition of England about 1492
(7 HEN. VII) when Columbus discovered the New World-a pivotal date in re-
lating our legal history to general history-see: TREVELYAN, op. cit. note II9, at
251 and 272 et seg.; CRoss, op. cit. note 49, at 278 et seg.; BALDWIN, op. cit. note
50, at 438; I LEADAM, op. cit. note 249, at xliv et seg., xcv; Vance, William
Reynolds, The Kansas Court of Industrial Relations with its Background (1921) 30
YALE L. J. 456, 459; Winfield, Percy H., The History of Maintenance and Chain-
perty (1919) 35 L. Q. Rnv. 5o , 69.
241 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 495, points out that in this committee we
have the genesis not only of the Star Chamber but also of the Privy Council:
"As the Tudor scheme of government through the Council developed, a different
organization of the Council and its business came into being. This new organi-
zation was grounded upon two lines of cleavage which, as the sixteenth century
proceeded, gradually grew up within the Council. The first of these lines of
cleavage was a distinction between the full members of the Privy Council and the
ordinary members of the Council. Both these lines of cleavage had something
to do with the separation of the Council acting as an executive body from the
Council acting as a judicial body-between, that is, the Privy Council and the
court of Star Chamber."
Pollard, op. cit. note 276, at 337, 530-531, points out the importance of dis-
tinguishing between that division of the old Council which continued to follow
the king and became known as the "Council Attendant" or "Council at Court"
and the Council remaining at Westminster. The Council Attendant more and
more confined itself to matters of state until in 154o Henry VIII (1509-1547)
reorganized it to form the Privy Council. See also: BALDWIN, op. cit. note 5o, at
462; Hudson, op. cit. note 182, at 24; 4 HoLDswoRTH, op. cit. note 2, at 64; ADAMs,
op. cit. note 174, at 248; POTTER, op. cit. note go, at 7o; I HALLAM, op. cit. note
277, at 49.
2843 HEN. VII, c. I: "An Act giving the Court of Star Chamber Authority to
punish divers Misdemeanors.
"The King our Sovereign Lord remembereth how by unlawful maintenances,
giving of liveries, signs, and tokens and retainders by indentures, promises,
oaths, writings or otherwise, embraceries of his subjects, untrue demeanings
of sheriffs in making of panels and other untrue returns, by taking of money
by juries, by great riots and unlawful assemblies, the policy and good rule of this
realm is almost subdued, and for the not punishing of these inconveniences
and by occasion of the premises nothing or little may be found by inquiry, where-
by the laws of the land in execution may take effect to the increase of murders,
robberies, perjuries and unsureties of all men living and losses of their lands and
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confirmed the right of such a conmittee of the Council, including
certain high officials, associating with them other specified persons,
to exercise the ancient prerogative jurisdiction, and which enumerated
as clearly within that power seven of the most prevalent abuses of
the time."'
goods, to the great displeasure of Almighty God, Be it therefore ordained for
reformation of the premises by authority of this parliament, That the Chancellor
and Treasurer of England for the time being and Keeper of the King's Privy
Seal or two of them, calling to them a bishop and a temporal lord of the King's
most honorable Council and the two chief justices of the King's Bench and the
Common Pleas for the time being, or other two justices in their absence, upon bill
or information put to the said Chancellor, for the King or any other, against
any person for any misbehaving afore rehearsed, have authority to call before
them by writ or privy seal the said misdoers and them and others by their dis-
cretion by whom the truth may be known to examine and such as they find there-
in defective to punish them after their demerits after the form and effect of
statutes thereof made in like manner and form as they should and ought to be
punished if they were thereof convict after the due order of the law."2
aBecause the words "Pro Camera Stellata" appear on the margin of the
statute, it was long thought to have created the Star Chamber as a new statutory
court. So strong was this belief that Parliament expressly repealed the statute
when abolishing the court in 1641. But Professor Pollard has determined that
this title was inserted in the margin perhaps a century later. Pollard, op. cit.
note 276, at 523. And the generally accepted view is that at most the statute
merely gave parliamentary recognition and assent to the exercise by this section
of the Council of the ancient prerogative jurisdiction of that body. I HOLDs-
WORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 494, 5o i et seg.; I LEADA, op. cit. note 249, at Ivii and
lxx; Scofield, op. cit. note 276, at 38 et seq.; BuRN, op. cit. note 176, at I et seg.;
COKE, op. cit. note 7, Cap. V, The Court of Star-Chamber, at 67; PROTHERO, op.
cit. note 16q, at ciii.
In like manner the Act of 21 HEN. VIII, C. 20 (1529) was an enabling rather
than a restrictive act in that it recognized the common practice of treating the
president of the Council as one of the magnates who presided over thesessions of
this committee of the Council. I LEADAM, op. cit. note 249, at xii; PALGRAVE, Op.
cit. note ioo, at 98.
Several recent authoritative writers incline to the opinion that the Act of 1487
did not relate to the Star Chamber at all but rather to a special or inner com-
mittee of the Council quite distinct from the Star Chamber; that "it was no part
of Henry's design to advertise in a public court like the Star Chamber the mis-
demeanors of his household officials. [Therefore, the privacy of the proceedings and
the absence of regular records]... Its object was to bring the more intimate
offenders before a more intimate tribunal." Pollard, op. cit. note 276, at 516, 526,
520. I HOLDSWOiTH, op. cit. note 2, at 495, seems to agree with this view in
his statement that "When this separation became well marked the Council
sitting in the Star Chamber-that is the Court of Star Chamber-did all and
more than all of the work of these statutory committees, and so rendered them
unnecessary." MAITLAND, op. cit. note 5, at 262, believes that the committee
endured distinct from the Council at least until 1529. PLUCKNETT, op. cit. note
5, at 14o , accords. This view, however, does not affect the general thesis that the
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The proceedings before this committee of the Council at West-
minster continued to be entitled as of old "coram rege et coiwilio"
(before king and council) and the records show that after the statute,
as before, the ing frequently presided in person.28 7 In the king's
absence the Lord Chancellor or Lord Keeper presided, but if he were
not present, the Lord Treasurer, the Lord President of the Council or
the Lord Privy Seal did so. 28 8 Originally all members of the Council
were eligible to act as judges, and it seems to have been customary
for such of them to sit as happened to be available.289 With the
gradual differentiation between that branch of the Council which
followed the king and became known as the Council Attendant (or
after 1540, the Privy Council) and the Ordinary Council (concilium
ordinarium),210 it came to pass that privy councillors sat in the Star
Chamber as of right, while the remaining judges of the court con-
sisted of ordinary councillors and other learned persons who were
specially commissioned and sworn for this service.291 As this commit-
tee of the Council in the Star Chamber assumed the character of a
act gave parliamentary support to the broad jurisdiction of the Council at West-
minster. Pollard concedes (p. 426) that "the act was not intended to, and did not
deprive the Council in the Star Chamber of its jurisdiction over similar offenses
committed outside the royal household, still less to determine the personnel
of that Council." This view explains the general failure to observe the pro-
visions of the statute which has mystified students for centuries.
287Hudson, op. cit. note 182, at 23; CoKE, op. cit. note 7, at 65; Scofield, op. cit.
note 276, at 5. Throughout the history of the court a chair was reserved therein
for the king's use, thus emphasizing the prerogative nature of the tribunal. I
LEADAm, op. cit. note 249, at Ivii; I HOLDswoRTn, op. cit. note 2, at 5oo, n. 2.
288Scofield, op. cit. note 273, at 6I.
289There seems to have been no requirement that even two of the three high
officials mentioned in the statute should be present in order to enable the court to
function, and in the earlier days many cases were decided by the king alone or by
but one of the three officials. I LEADAm, op. cit. note 249, at xlvni-xlx; Hudson,
op. cit. note 182, at 23. 290See supra note 284.
291Pollard, op. cit. note 276, at 537; BALDWIN, op. cit. note 50, at 450 et seq.; I
HOLDSWORTH, Op. cit. note 2, at 5oo; Scofield, op. cit. note 276, at II et seq., 33;
I LEADAm, op. cit. note 249, at xlii. Prior to the reign of Henry VII the term
"Lords of the Council" was truly descriptive, for only members of the heredity
nobility seem to have sat there. As the nobility forsook learning for arms and
became ignorant, dissolute swashbucklers, it was but natural they should have
turned upon each other. By their might they had seized power which they lacked
the brains to wield. The attempt of such a council of hereditary magnates to rule
brought on the Wars of the Roses and the fall of a dynasty. The Tudors were
keen enough to see the errors of their royal predecessors in staffing the council,
and it was their wisdom in introducing trained knights and commoners into it
which explains its rejuvenation beginning with Henry VII. The conciliarii nati
(councillors by birth) gradually gave way to the appointed high official and the
specially commissioned councillor.
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court, its membership became somewhat more defined. There are
indications of a customary quorum of councillors in the Star Cham-
ber, the number of which varied in different reigns.21 Many others,
however, commonly attended so that during and after the time of
Henry VIII, "the presence", as it was called, frequently exceeded
twenty.211 It would seem that the reference in the statute Pro
Camera Stellata to the two chief justices of the common law as asso-
ciated with the new committee of the Council was merely in recogni-
tion of their ancient function as advisers to king and Council. In
later years, when the Council in the Star Chamber had evolved into a
court, they seem to have become standing judges of that tribunal, as
pointed out by Coke, who himself as a chief justice sat in the Star
Chamber, while other common law justices were usually among those
specially commissioned and sworn. 2 9 4
The Star Chamber possessed criminal and civil jurisdiction. It
originated primarily to meet the defects of the common law in dealing
with crime, for it succeeded to the old criminal jurisdiction of Chan-
cery.295 As the great prerogative court of criminal jurisdiction, how-
ever, it did not hesitate to override the ordinary course of the common
law in times of emergency or with respect to the offenses of too-
powerful subjects and in other matters which it deemed to threaten the
212COKE, op. cit. note 7, at 64, mentions eight judges as sitting. 4 HOLDS-
WORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 65; says four constituted a quorum for general business
but six were required for a judgment. Pollard, op. cit. note 276, at 525, denies
that a quorum was necessary in the Star Chamber.
29Hudson, op. cit. note 182, at 36; I LEADAm, op. cit. note 249, at xmviii-
xlv; 4 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 64; Scofield, op. cit. note 276, at 25.
214CoKE, op. cit. note 7, at 62; 5 BACON, Lord Chancellor Francis, WORKS
(1621) (ed. 1803) 54, History of King Henry VII, seems to support Coke: "This
court of Star Chamber is compounded of good elements, for it consisteth of four
kinds of persons, councillors, peers, prelates, and chief justices." As Professor
Holdsworth sagely observes, "There is a strong case in favour of a view in which
Coke and Bacon agreed." I HoLDSWORTH, Op. Cit. note 2, at 513. Also LEADAm
AND BALDWIN, op. cit. note 185, at xvi, refers to "an ex officio element in the
justices of both benches..." And see: Pollard, op. cit. note 276, at 342, 525; I
IHOLDsWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 5oo; 4 ibid. 64; I LEADAm, op. cit. note 249, at
xxxiv-xxxviii, xlv et seg., and lxx; DIcEY, op. it. note 193, at 99; Scofield, op. cit.
note 276, at 10, 26, 42-43; SMITH, Sir Thomas, C6MMONWEALTH OF ENGLAND
(1565) (ed. 1589) 118; Hudson, op. cit. note 182, at 22, 52; MAITLAND AND MON-
TAGUE, op. cit. note 65, at II9.
2951 HOLDswoRTH, op. cit. note 2, at 4o8; 5 ibid. 214; BALDWIN, op. cit. note 50,
at 261; I SPENCE, op. cit. note 2, at 341, 685 et seq.; MAITLAND, op. cit. note 143, at
19; TREVELYAN, op. cit. note IIg, at 277; POLLOCK, THE GENIUS OF THE COMMON
LAW (1912) 42. See supra note 209. Cf. LEADAm AND BALDWIN, Op. cit. note
185, at xxx, and ci, for a history of the development of this jurisdiction in the
King's Council prior to the Star Chamber.
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peace of the realm.29 Thus, "the Star Chamber exercised a criminal
jurisdiction almost without limitation and altogether without ap-
peal. '29 7 The one restraint upon this arbitrary power was that it
could not inflict a penalty of life or limb.29 8 It could try treason or
felonies only as trespasses against the public peace and subject the
offenders to no greater penalties than fine or imprisonment.299 In
taking jurisdiction of the lesser crimes, a field which the older com-
mon law had neglected, the Star Chamber stepped into a breach in the
criminal law of the time and laid the foundations for several branches
of our substantive criminal law of misdemeanors, such as criminal
libel, conspiracy, fraud, maintenance and forgery.30 The list of
offenses recited in the enabling statutes, described above, was never
regarded as a limitation upon its vague and indefinite ancient juris-
diction. In addition to crimes of violence, crimes affecting the ad-
ministration of justice and the misdemeanors mentioned, it assumed
jurisdiction over attempts to commit crimes, and over heresy, chal-
lenges, duels, maintenance and champerty, dissemination of false
2
"Unfortunately, it sometimes overrode the common law processes in favor of
the offender. 4 HOLDSWORTH, Op. cit. note 2, at 86-87; 5 ibid. 187. DicEy, op.
cit. note 193, at 112, thus describes one of the chief means and purposes for in-
fluencing the law courts: "In some instances the King transferred to the Star
Chamber cases on which the courts were about to pronounce a decision. When
this was done, it wanted but one more step for the King, as the phrase went, 'to
take the matter into his own hands,' and, if he chose, pardon the offence, generally
after a receipt of a large sum of money. Instances abound in Henry VII's reign,
where criminals escaped justice by bribing the monarch. Entries in the minutes,
such as 'the Earl of Derby, for his pardon, £6,ooo;' 'for the pardon of William
Harper, for treasons, felonies, escapes, and other offences, 2oo marks;' which
occur frequently in the Star Chamber's records, tell their own tale." And see
BURN, op. cit. note 176, at 32 et seg.; MAITLAND, op. cit. note 5, at 219.
2974 REEVES, op. cit. note 1O5, at 151; MAITLAND, op. cit. note 143, at 19; I
SPENCE, op. cit. note 2, at 341.
218I HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 59-63, 487-8, attributes this restriction
to the thirty-ninth clause of Magna Carta, which provides that, "No freeman
shall be taken or/and imprisoned, or disseised, or exiled, or in any way destroyed,
nor will we go upon him nor will we send upon him, except by the lawful judgment
of his peers or/and by the law of the land." He observes (p. 488): "It is clear
that this limitation of its jurisdiction over criminal cases had important effects
upon the growth of English criminal law. It ensured that the most serious crimes
should be tried by the ordinary procedure of the common law courts, and not by
the extraordinary procedure of the Council and Star Chamber."
2995 HOLDSWORTn, op. cit. note 2, at 188; DICEY, op. cit. note 193, at 113.
3005 HoLDswoRTH, op. cit. note 2, at 197 et seg.; I ibi. 504 et seg.; PoUND, op.
cit. note x42, at 122; DicEY, op. cit. note 193, at io5 et seg.; BALDwIN, op. cit. note
5o, at 271 et seg.; Hudson, op. cit. note 182, at 65-I13; CoKE, op. cit. note 7, at 63.
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and seditious rumors, contempt of public authorities,30' violation of
royal proclamations,3 2 and all other acts which it deemed inimical
to public welfare30 3 It also maintained a stringent supervision over
common law juries, frequently fining and imprisoning them for
verdicts obviously contrary to the evidence, and thus made the jury
once more an efficient instrument in the administration of justice.0 4
On the civil side the Star Chamber exercised a wide jurisdiction so
long as there was need of a summary executive justice to supplement
the common law courts for the protection of the poor and "un-
mighty" in their civil rights. With the reestablishment of law and
3nun Merry Wives of Windsor, Shakespeare plays upon this feature of Star
Chamber jurisdiction:
"Sal. Sir Hugh, persuade me not; I will make a star-chamber matter of it; if he
were twenty Sir John Falstaffs, he shall not abuse Robert Shallow, Esquire.
Slen. In the county of Gloster, justice of peace and Coram.
Shal. Ay, cousin Slender, and Custalorum.
Slen. Ay, and Ratolorum, too; and a gentleman born, master parson, who
writes himself Armigero; in any bill, warrant, quittance, or obligation,
Armigero."
WHITE, Edward J., COMMENTARIES ON THE LAw IN SHAKESPEARE (2d ed. I913)
28; KEETON, George W., SHAKESPEARE AND HIS LEGAL PROBLEMS (1930) 39.
302The power of the king to issue proclamations having the force and effect of
law also rested upon the ancient prerogative. Nor was this lost sight of in the
enactment of the famous Statute of Proclamations, 31 HEN. VIII, c. 8 (154o)
designed, like the Statute Pro Camera Stellata, to reconcile the people to a great
extension of government by the prerogative incident to the religious reestablish-
ment. This Act confirmed the right of the king with the advice of a majority of
his Council to issue ordinances and proclamations having the force of an act
of Parliament. ThaIt the repeal of the act in 1547 (I EDW. VI 11547-1553] C. 12)
did not affect the prerogative authority of royal proclamations is seen from their
continued use and from the fact that, as Scofield, (op. cit. note 276, at 48) points
out, "'contemners of the royal pleasure and command'...were the special prey
of the Star Chamber." Also see PORT, Frederick J., ADmiNISTRATIVE LAW
(1929) 42.
303The scope of the criminal jurisdiction of the Star Chamber is discussed in: 5
HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 197 el seq.; Scofleld, op. cit. note 276, at 38 et seq.;
DIcEY, op. cit. note 193, at io5 et seq.; Hudson, op. cit. note 182, at 62 et seg.; COKE,
op. cit. note 7, at 63.
3 0 PLUCKNETT, op. cit. note 5, at Ii-I 14, and see note 342, infra; I HOLDS-
WORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 343 et seq.; POTTER, op. cit. note 9o, at 71. The old
remedy of attaint of a petty jury for misbehavior, found by a grand jury upon
review of the same evidence, with its severe punishments had become ineffective.
The reason was that after the jurors became triers of the fact, rather than wit-
nesses, it was found almost impossible to get a grand jury to attaint them. Conse-
quently, the Star Chamber took over the supervision of the jury to assure true
verdicts. Although long obsolete, the attaint was not abolished by statute until
1825. I HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 343; THAYER, op. cit. note 6I, at 149
et seq.
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order, much of this remedial jurisdiction was absorbed by Chancery
in exchange for its old semi-criminal jurisdiction.3 5 Thereafter, the
Star Chamber's civil jurisdiction was based chiefly upon its tradi-
tional protection of the commercial and maritime rights of foreign-
ers,"'0 the enforcement of the right of the king's almoner to the for-
feited goods of a feo de se (a suicide) or to deodands,0 7 or upon its
vague and indefinite authority over acts contrary to the public wel-
fare. In the latter capacity of custios morum (guardian of the mores of
the time) it set itself up to be a censor of good morals and conservator
of the established order.0 8 Under this broad power it brought within
its grasp all sorts of private controversies, ranging from such ec-
clesiastical causes as matrimonial disputes 0 9 and testamentary
contests310 to the most trivial personal matters, as settling a quarrel
between neighbors, fining wealthy London families who did not
observe the custom of taldng a place in the country for the summer,
or collecting a tailor's bill.' Nor did it hesitate to step in and compel
a fair composition by the creditors of an insolvent but honest trades-
man.312 For the most part this was a concurrent jurisdiction with the
courts of common law, the ecclesiastical courts and the admiralty
court.31
3
365See supra note 295.
3065 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 137; Hudson, op. cit. note 182, at 52;
BALDWIN, op. cit. note 50, at 272 et seg.; LEADAM AND BALDWIN, op. cit. note 185,
at xcii.
307The gift of such forfeits by royal charter were termed the king's alms.
The almoner recovereth only what is detained, or the value, or something in lieu
thereof, as the court shall think fit, without fine or punishment." Hudson, op. cit.
note 182, at 57, 137. See the description of royal prerogatives and droits under
the Coroner's Court, supra.
3081 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 5o4; 5 ibid. 213; 8 ibid. 407; 4 STEPHEN,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (i6th ed. by Jenks, 1914) 315; DIcEY,
op. cit. note 193, at 1o9; 4 BLACKSTONE, op. Cit. note 23, at 310.
3091 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 507; DIcEY, op. cit. note 193, at I I I. About
16r8 Lady Hatton, second wife of the celebrated Sir Edward Coke, Lord Chief
justice, charged him in the Star Chamber with riot for having abducted their
fourteen-year-old daughter by violence in order to secure her marriage to Sir John
Villiers, brother of the Duke of Buckingham, favorite of King James I. 5 HOLDS-
WORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 443; BURN, op. cit. note 176, at 85. Cf. LYON AND
BLOCK, EDWARD COKE, ORACLE OF THE LAW (1929) 246.
31 Hudson, op. cit. note 182, at 56; I HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 507.
3111 HOLDSWORTE, op. cit. note 2, at 506; DICEY, op. cit. note 193, at lO5 et
seg.; BURN, op. cit. note 176, Preface; 5 BACON, op. cit. note 294, at 186.
3121 HOLDSWORTE, op. cit. note 2, at 504.
3131 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 5o4; 4 ibid. 274--275; Hudson, op. cit. note
182, at 19, 214--215; 4 COKE, op. cit. note 7, at 63; SMITH, op. cit. note 294, at 12O;
PROTHERO, op. cit. note 169, at cvii.
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Still another aspect of the Star Chamber, which is of especial
importance to us today, was its function as a central administrative
board or commission.3 4 In this capacity it regulated corporations,315
labor,1' printing and other trades,37 and the supply and prices of
staples, such as grain, meat, butter, cheese, etc.,318 much as our state
public service commissions regulate public utilities and the Federal
Trade Commission at Washington umpires big business.
Closely associated with this administrative side of the "public
jurisdiction 1' 9 of the Star Chamber was its supervision of the
judiciary in the administration of local justice. An important feature
of this supervision was an address by the Lord Chancellor or other
high official of this court to the assembled justices of the common law
on the eve of their departure to hold the Assizes. The court also called
periodic convocations of the justices of the peace for admonition on
the discharge of their duties.n°
The Star Chamber sat on stated days for the public hearing of
cases, usually two or three times a week, during the regular terms of
the law courts. Its procedure was set in motion in civil matters by an
informal bill or petition, much as in Chancery, and in criminal cases
by an information or suggestion presented to the court by the at-
torney-general. The latter acted sometimes on his own initiative,
sometimes on that of the court, but normally on the relation of a
3144 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 67 et seg.; POUND, op. cit. note 142, at 68;
Pound, op. cit. note 178, at 134; POLLOCK, Op. cit. note 295, at 42 et seg.
315Hudson, op. cit. note 182, at 54, 131; I HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 506; 4
isiu. 347, 381; 5 ibid. 137; PRICE, William H., THE ENGLISH PATENTS OF MON-
OPOLY (I9o6) 43, 120, 126. The corporation of that day was not the general
business instrument we know. The few corporations there were enjoyed special
monopolies and, therefore, were closely watched.
3164 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 347.
317Scofield, op. cit. note 276, at 52 et seg.; 5 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 2o8;
Vance, op. cit. note 283, at 456 et seq.
312 LEADAm, op. cit. note 249, (25 Selden Society, 191o) at xxi et seq., contains an
extensive survey of this branch of the administrative jurisdiction of the Star
Chamber. 4 HOLDSWORTH, Op. Cit. note 2, at 351 et seg.; Scofield, op. cit. note 276,
at 54.
M1The jurisdiction of the Star Chamber is sometimes classified into "public
jurisdiction" and "private jurisdiction". Its public jurisdiction included the
criminal jurisdiction, the regulatory administrative jurisdiction, the supervisory
jurisdiction over the administration of justice, and the survival of its ancient
governmental functions. I HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 504 et seq.; Hudson,
op. cit. note 182, at 52, 62, 107, 113.
3204 HoLDswoRT, op. cit. note 2, at 75-78, 83 et seg.; Hudson, op. cit. note 182,
at 53; Scofield, op. cit. note 276, at 56, 58; BEARD, op. cit. note 89, at i8 et seq.
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person who claimed knowledge of the facts.32' In the "ordinary
procedure", which was used in cases having no special public inter-
est, process did not issue until after the filing of the bill or informa-
tion. m Even on process by bill under this procedure, the defendant
who failed to answer the plaintiff's bill was committed to prison. If
he persisted in not answering, the bill was taken pro confesso and he
was punished.3n
In cases regarded as involving the welfare of the state, the accused
was subjected to what Hudson describes as "an extraordinary kind
of proceeding, more short and more expeditious, which is called
ore tenus."324 Under this process the accused was arrested by a per-
suivant or messenger of the court and was privately examined."5
Hudson tells us that if he denied the accusation, the court could not
proceed against him ore tenus, but, "If he confessed the offense,
freely and voluntarily, without constraint, then may he be brought
2'Hudson, op. cit. note 182, at 126, says: "I must begin with the inception of
every suit, which is either by some particular person's complaint, or by the
curious eye of the state and king's council prying into the inconveniences and
mischiefs which abound in the Commonwealth." 4 BLACKSTONE, op. cit. note 23,
at 3o9-3io, asserts that prosecution of criminal causes by information or sug-
gestion filed on record by the proper official was as ancient as the common law
itself. This method of criminal prosecution was limited to misdemeanors; prose-
cution for felony had to be by indictment of a grand jury, that is, its finding on
oath that there was sufficient ground for instituting a criminal prosecution.
And see: 9 HOLDsWO=TH, op. cit. note 2, at 236 et seg.; CARTER, op. cit. note 68, at
84 et seg.; Scofield, op. cit. note 276, at 73.
mThis was the practice described in the statute Pro Camera Stelata, for which
see note 285, supra. The process was usually by subpoena, but might be by
letters missive or writ under the Privy Seal. I LEADAm, op. cit. note 249, at xxi;
Hudson, op. cit. note 182, at 142; 5 HoLDswoRTH, op. cit. note 2, at 161, 178.
mHudson, op. cit. note 182, at 168; Scofield, op. cit. note 276, at 75; DIcEY, op.
cit. note 193, at IO3.
mHudson, op. cit. note 182, at 127. He admits this procedure was much
blamed as seeming to oppose the Magna Carta and the enabling acts, "by reason
there is no judicial proceeding nor complaint exhibited whereunto the party
charged to be an offender hath space given him to answer, or liberty to advise
with counsel...yet in case of necessity, the lawful use of this course of pro-
ceeding would appear as fair to the eye of justice as any other whatsoever."
And see: i LEADAM, op. cit. note 249, at lxvii; 5 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at
165-166; Scofield, op. cit. note 276, at 76; DIcEY, op. cit. note 193, at 102.
mlIndeed, under this extraordinary procedure the members of the Council
in the Star Chamber assumed the right to arrest citizens on information or sug-
gestion made to them personally instead of as a body, and on their own initiative.
DIcEY, op. cit. note 193, at 116. See protest of the common law judges (1591)
against such arrests of subjects for pursuing their legal remedies. PROTHERO,
op. cit. note 169, at 446; 1 HoLDswoRTa, op. cit. note 2, at 5o9; I HALLAM, Op.
cit. note 277, at 234.
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to the bar; at which time his confession is showed him; and if he
acknowledge it, then who can doubt but that the court may justly
proceed ex ore suo [on his own word], and give judgment against
him." '326 This great apologist for the Star Chamber admits, however,
that this "extraordinary procedure" was frequently carried to excess
and warns that since "this course of proceeding is an exuberancy of
prerogative" it should be kept scrupulously within its proper bounds. 3 7
Unfortunately, it was precisely this which was not done. Drunk with
the arrogant power of the prerogative, the Star Chamber introduced
much of the inquisitorial procedure then prevalent in the criminal
courts of the absolute monarchies of the continent.118
Although the common law forbade resort to torture, the king under
his prerogative could by personal letter or through his Council
authorize its use in matters affecting the state.19 This concession was
seized upon by the court, and, as it developed ingenuity in discerning
matters of state in almost any case, the extraordinary procedure thus
became the ordinary procedure. Putting prisoners and witnesses on
the rack grew to be a common practice.no Since in England, as under
the civil law, the nobility were held to be exempt from torture, the
employment of this gruesome practice by the Council took the ap-
pearance of class oppression and made the Star Chamber doubly
odious to the rising commons."' Furthermore, all prisoners in the
Star Chamber, like those charged with treason or felony in the King's
Bench, were denied counsel, and for a long period even the right to
present witnesses in their defense. The rule against self-incrimina-
tion was unknown and the ordinary rules of evidence were wholly
disregarded.112 The very judges trying the case took the part of
prosecutors, not only cross-examining the accused in the most
n26Hudson, op. cit. note 182, at 127. CoKE, op. cit. note 7, at 63, adds that "if
his confession be set down... otherwise than he meant, he may deny it and then
they cannot procede against him but by bill or information, which is the fairest
way." DHudson, op. cit. note I82, at 128; 5 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note2, at 165.
325 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 168 et seg.; Hudson, op. cit. note 182, at
36; BURN, op. cit. note 176, at Io.
32'CoKE, THIRD INSTITUTE (2628) (ed. 1797) 35; JARDINE, David, USE OF
TORTURE IN ENGLAND (2837) 6, 59; SMITH, op. cit. note 294, Chap. 26; 4 HOLDS-
WORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 273.
n°DicEy, op. cit. note 193, at II2; 5 HoLDswoRTH, op. cit. note 2, at 185, 194;
JARDINE, op. cit. note 329, at 15 et seg.
331 Coke, C. J., in Countess of Shrewsbury's Case, 12 Coke Rep. 96 (1612), S. C.
2 HOWELL'S STATE TRIALS 774; JARDINE, op. cit. note 329, at 65; 5 HOLDSWORTH,
op. cit. note 2, at I85.
=35 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 190 et seg.; Hudson, op. cit. note 282, at128.
But THAYER, op. cit. note 61, at 153, says that even in the common law courts of
the last half of the sixteenth century one accused of treason or felony was denied
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vicious manner but commonly resorting to violent personal abuse
in the course of the trial. Their unseemly levity and vituperative
remarks when imposing sentence have left an indelible impression of
abhorrence upon all English peoples.333 Even with respect to the
ordinary procedure of the court, Holdsworth points out that "in the
obligation of the defendant to answer and to submit to interrogatories
on oath, in the secrecy of the examination of both defendants and
witnesses and in the manner of hearing the case on written evidence,
we can see continental influences. '" 33
The arbitrary infliction of cruel and unusual punishments by the
Star Chamber also smacked of the absolutism of the continent.33" 5
Although, as pointed out above, it was prohibited from inflicting
sentences depriving of life or limb, its indiscriminate use of other
penalties, after it had served its purpose by reestablishing law and
order, has left a hateful remembrance of arbitrary administration of
justice. Even on the civil side it enforced its judgments by unlimited
imprisonment for contempt,38 while on the criminal side the im-
position of staggering fines, both for revenue33 7 and in terrorem,13 and
both counsel and witnesses. A vivid description of such a trial in the King's
Bench will be found in SMITH, op. cit. note 294, Chap. 25.
mNowhere has this tyrannical action of the judges been more vividly portrayed
than by the Earl of Clarendon, the royalist historian of the Rebellion, who quotes
the ancient wisdom of Thucydides (lib. I, c. 77) that "men are much more pas-
sionate for injustice than for violence." I CLARENDON, HISTORY OF THE RE-
BELLION (1702) (Macray's ed. 1888) 86 et seg. And see BURN, op. cit. note 176,
at 135. IN5 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 144.
31 Hudson, op. cit. note 182, at 225 refers to this and describes a famous case:
"Sometimes the punishment is by the wisdom of the court invented in some new
manner for new offences; as for Traske, who raised Judaism up from death, and
forbade the eating of swine's flesh, he was sentenced to be fed with swine's flesh
when he was in prison." For other instances, see CARTER, op. cit. note 68, at 86.
31Hudson, op. cit. note 182, at 122; 6 HoLDswoRTH, p. cit. note 2, at 34, 39, 54.
1 33The Stuarts resorted to Henry VII's abuse of the power of the prerogative
to collect revenue by huge fines imposed by the Star Chamber under the guise
of administration of the criminal law. Also; cases of treason and felony were
sometimes removed by King and Council into the Star Chamber pending trial
in the common law court of King's Bench and further proceedings there were
barred by a writ of prohibition. The king would then grant a pardon, meaning
life and liberty to the prisoner, for an enormous fine. Sometimes this power was
exercised to favor powerful nobles. Fines estreated to the Exchequer and were
levied and collected like judgment debts. Unfortunately, sometimes the king
made a gift of a fine to some courtier, and under the Stuarts the informer was
given a share of the fine. Hudson, op. cit. note 182, at 224, says a fine was always
accompanied by sentence to imprisonment in order to assure payment of the fine.
Also see: Scofield, op. cit. note 276, at 77-79; DIcEY, op. cit. note 193, at 112;
BuRN, op. cit. note 176, at iv-v; 4 BLACKSTONE, op. cit. note 23, at 429.3 8sHudson, op. cit. note z82, at 36, 224; I HoLDswoaRT, op. cit. note 2, at 5o6.
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the casual sentencing to imprisonment for lifen9 and other harsh and
unusual punishments, inflicted upon women as well as men, "such as
the pillory, nailing or cutting off the ears, branding, whipping, slitting
the nose, wearing in public places papers indicating the offense com-
mitted, riding around Westminster Hall with face to the horse's
tail, "MO and marching the convicted through the streets clad only in
his shirt, made it the dread of every subject. 4
To add to its obloquy the Star Chamber as early as the reign of
Mary (1553-1558) began to prostitute its extraordinary jurisdiction
over common law juries by coercing them to bring in verdicts of guilty
in political and other state cases, even though contrary to the evi-
dence, on penalty of exorbitant fines and imprisonment should they
acquit the accused.m The pages of history afford no finer examples of
upright manhood than the fortitude with which some juries, knowing
what was before them, acquitted high political prisoners rather than
become parties to taking the life of an innocent man, and withstood




9DICay, op. cit. note 193, at 125; CARTER, Op. cit. note 68, at 88; BURN, op. cit.
note 176, at 116, 129; I HALLAII, op. cit. note 277, at 426.
34Hudson, op. cit. note 382, at 224; COKE, op. cit. note 7, at 65; Scofield, op. cit.
note 276, at 77. 34BuRN, op. cit. note 176, at 47.
342THAYER, op. cit. note 61, at 162 et seq.; I HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 343-
344; Scofield, op. cit. note 276, at 45; SMITH, op. cit. note 294, Book III, Chap. iI I;
PLUCKNETT, op. cit. note 5, at 113 et seq.; 4 BLACKSTONE, op. cit. note 23, at 361.
Upon the abolition of the Star Chamber the common law criminal courts claimed
and exercised till 1670 its jurisdiction for punishing dishonest or recalcitrant
juries. In the famous Bushell's Case (Vaughan 135, s. c. 6 HOWELL'S STATE
TRIALS 999), the jurors, having been fined and imprisoned by the Sessions Court
of Old Bailey for acquitting the Quakers, William Penn, the founder of Pennsyl-
vania, and William Mead, on a charge of taking part in an unlawful assembly,
were discharged on habeas corpus issued by the Common Pleas. By the famous
opinion of Vaughan, C. J., in that case the character of jurors as judges of the
facts was vindicated and punishment of jurors for their verdicts was fin ally
ended. See THAYER, op. cit. note 61, at 166; I HoLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 345.
It had been customary also for justices of the peace and justices of Assize to fine
grand juries for not bringing indictments as directed. The danger of this practice
to the cherished liberties of the free Englishman is pointed out by LORD CHIEF
JUSTICE HALE, 2 HISTORY OF PLEAS OF THE CROWN (first printed 1736) (Stokes
and Ingersoll, ist Am. ed. 1847) *159 et seg.
3MThe punishment meted out to the jury which acquitted Sir Nicholas Throck-
morton of treason upon his own masterly defense, since as usual in such cases he
was denied counsel, has become historic. The jurors were immediately im-
prisoned on announcing their verdict April 17, 1554. Sometime later four weaker
members confessed their error and were released. The other eight remained in
prison until October 26th, when they were brought before the Council in the Star
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The Council in the Star Chamber, which had come into existence
to preserve the liberties of the poor and unmighty at a time when the
common law and the common law courts failed them, and which had
served so well that for centuries it was hailed, in the words of Coke,
"the most honorable court, (our Parliament excepted) that is in the
Christian world, . ."3 thus degenerated under the Stuarts into a
political and inquisitorial tribunal which to this day stands out in
English constitutional history as the epitome of all that is abhorrent
to the genius of English institutions. As prosecutor, judge, jury and
executioner all in one, it became such an engine of royal tyranny that
it was one of the chief causes of the Puritan Rebellion." 5
In 1641 the Long Parliament abolished the Star Chamber and its
two chief satellites-the Council of Wales and the Marches, and the
Council of the North. 8 The supplemental jurisdiction of the Star
Chamber, such as its jurisdiction over misdemeanors, over juries,
and as custos morum, reverted into the court of King's Bench, 7
which to the end of the Westminster epoch remained the great court
for crown cases, that is, those involving injuries to the state and the
public welfare. With the passing of these prerogative courts of crimi-
Chamber and asked to admit their wrong. Instead, they stoutly declared they
had found according to their consciences and as honest men, whereupon they were
remanded to prison. The foreman and another were fined £2000 each, while the
remaining six were each fined iooo marks. On December 12th, five were re-
leased on paying £220 each, and on December 2Ist the last three paid £6o apiece
and went home. That the Council eventually relented, may be due to the fact
that the royal vengeance visited upon this jury proved so effective that Sir John
Throckaorton, a brother, by this time had been convicted by another jury on
the same evidence and executed. I HOWELL'S STATE TRIALS 870, 902; THAYER,
op. cit. note 61, at 163; I HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 344.344CoKE, op. cit. note 7, at 65. For other eulogies of the court see: Hudson,
op. cit. note 182, at 22; I HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 507; 5 BACON, Op. cit.
note 294, at 290.
3mMany of our modem administrative tribunals, such as the public service
commissions, possess similar incompatible powers, relieved only by the right of
review for arbitrary abuse of those powers and consequent violation of the pro-
tection of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. Thompson,
G. J., The Next Step in Public Utility Regulation (1922) 28 W. VA. L. Q. 253,
262-263.
M816 CAR. I (1625-1649) c. I0, which received the assent of the king July 15,
1641. It provided that the court should cease to function on the first day of
August, 1641. See: I CLARENDON, op. cit. note 333, at 374-375; I HOLDSWORTH,
op. cit. note 2, at 515; 6 ibid. 112; MAITLAND, op. cit. note 5, at 311; 4 STEPHEN, op.
cit. note 308, at 315.
34 PALGRAVE, op. cit. note IOO, at III; 8 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 306,
407; 4 BLACKSTONE, op. cit. note 23, at 266.
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nal jurisdiction the official infliction of torture also disappeared.34 8
So ended the old order amid events which marked the dawn of the
modem era of constitutional representative government.39
THE COUNCILS Op THE BORDERS
The Council of Wales and the Marches35 seems to have taken
definite form when Edward IV (1461-1483) first created a President
and Council of 'the Marches to govern Wales and the bordering
English counties, which were still in a lawless state. Like the Anglo-
Saxon courts, this Council was a governmental, administrative and
judicial body, and proved to be a most efficient instrument for the
reestablishment of the king's peace on that turbulent frontier. Shortly
after the union of England and Wales in 1536, it was recognized by
the Act of 1543,1 as a prerogative court, with such jurisdiction as the
king might confer. It exercised a prerogative jurisdiction similar
to that of the Star Chamber and an extensive equitable and common
law jurisdiction as well, the latter concurrent with that of the Welsh
courts. In fact, its criminal jurisdiction exceeded that of the Star
Chamber, for it was empowered to try the offenses of treason and
felony and inflict the death penalty. 5 2 Although it fell with the Star
Chamber, to which it was subordinate, it was revived with its equi-
table and common law jurisdictions on the Restoration of Charles II
in 166o, only to be finally vanquished by statute in 1689 in the after-
math of the "Glorious Revolution" of i688 which dethroned James II(1685-1689).13
The Council of the North31 was an outgrowth of an organization
'Although there seems to have been some attempt to revive torture about
1673, no record has yet been found of the actual infliction of torture after the
abolition of the court of Star Chamber. JARDINE, op. cit. note 329, at 57-58.
Cf. SENIOR, William, DOCTOR'S CoMMoNs AND THE OLD CouRT OF ADMIRALTY
(1922) IO3.
u
9DICEY, op. cit. note 193, at 132; I HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 516. PLUCK-
NETT, op. cit. note 5, at 140, states that in the fall of the Star Chamber passed the
ancient mediaeval Council-the last of the Curia Regis. Accord: BALDWIN, Op.
cit. note 50, at 442; Pollard, op. cit. note 276, at 535.
35I HosLDSwoRTH, Op. cit. note 2, at 122, 126, 502 et seq.; 4 ibid. 73 et seq.;
COKE, op. cit. note 7, at 241; PROTHERO, op. cit. note 169, at cix et seg., 378 el
seg.; SKEEL, Caroline A. S., TEE CoUNcI. IN THE MARCHES OF WALES (1904).
' 3 4 & 35 HENRY VIII, C. 26, § 4.
152 HOLDSWORTH, Op. cit. note 2, at 5o3n. Cf. REID, R. R., THE KING'S COUN-
CIL IN TEE NORTH (1921) 283 et seq.
"31 WILLIAM & MARY, C. 27. I HOLDSWORTn, op. cit. note 2, at 127.
35 4REID, op. cit. note 352; PROTHERO, op. cit. note 169, at cx et seg., 363 et seq.;
I HOLDSWORTE, op. cit. note 2, at 113, 502 et seg.; COKE, op. cit. note 7, at 245;
CARTER, op. cit. note 68, at 89.
ANGLO-AMERICAN JUDICIAL SYSTEM
created by Henry VII for the maintenance of law and order in the
restless counties on the Scottish border. It was reorganized with a
Lord President at its head on the pattern of the older Council of Wales
and the Marches by Henry VIII in 1537, following the suppression
of the northern revolt known as the Pilgrimage of Grace. This little
Star Chamber of the North exercised approximately the broad juris-
diction of the Council of Wales and the Marches, and in a similarly
efficient manner. As we have seen, it shared the fate of most of the
other prerogative courts.
Among the other courts whose Star Chamber jurisdiction was
abolished by the Act of 1641 was the Court of the Duchy Chamber of
Lancaster and the Court of Exchequer of the County Palatine of
Chester.35 5 The counties palatine received this title from the fact
that, owing to the difficulty of maintaining order in those border
counties, the crown early vested the ruling lords with the most
extensive prerogative powers-the power of pardon, of appointing
judges, of issuing process, and of keeping the peace. By the Act of
1536, Henry VIII regained for the crown the power of appointment
of judges and the pardoning power. Thereafter, also, writs were
required to issue in the king's name but were tested (attested) in the
name of the lord of the county palatine. 56 The palatinate counties
had their own complete system of courts. The courts of the Palatinate
of Chester and of the royal franchise of Ely were extinguished by
statute prior to the Judicature Act of 1873. That act abolished the
Common Pleas Courts of the surviving counties palatine, but the
Chancery Court of the County Palatine of Lancaster and the
Chancery Court of the County Palatine of Durham still survive as
ancient prerogative courts. 17
THE COURT OF REQUESTS
The Court of Requests5 8 was a prerogative court presided over by
the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, and was also known as the Court
"-'I HOLDSWORTH, Op. cit. note 2, at io8 et seq., 515; COKE, op. cit. note 7, at 204
et seg.; CARTER, op. cit. note 68, at 115 et seg.; 3 BLACKSTONE, op. cit. note 23, at
78 et seg.
3"2 7 HENRY VIII, C. 24. I HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 112; 3 BLACKSTONE,
op. cit. note 23, at 78 et seq.
179 HALSBURY, Lord Chancellor, LAWS OF ENGLAND (1909) 120 el seq.; ODGERS,
THE ENGLISH COURTS OF LAW (1929) 58 et seg.; I HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2,
at 114, 117; ENGLISH ANNUAL PRACTICE, or "White Book" (1930) 1215.
2 8LEADA2, SELECT CASES IN THE COURT OF REQUESTS (12 Seldon Society,
1898) xi et seg.; I HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 412-416; BALDWIN, Op. Cit.
note 5o, at 442 el seq.; PLUCKNETT, op. cit. note 5, at I42; CARTER, op. cit. note 68,
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of Whitehall from the room in which it sat at Westminster. It was
established without statute or ordinance as a standing committee of
the Council by Henry VII about 1493.159 As a committee of the Privy
Council it undertook to supplement the work of the committee sitting
in the Star Chamber in the maintenance of law and order, but when
the Star Chamber came to function more efficiently the jurisdiction
of the Court of Requests became almost wholly civil. It heard claims
for royal boons, suits by the king's servants, and the petitions of poor
men for extraordinary relief. It was the court most ready to entertain
suits by plaintiffs in forma pauperis (in the character of a person
sworn not to be worth £5), and as the poor man's court of equity it
achieved great popularity.8 0 Cardinal Wolsey divided the court
into two branches-one sitting permanently at Westminster, which
later consisted of two Masters of Requests Extraordinary; the other
consisting of two Masters Ordinary who attended the king's person.
After Henry VIII's reign the Masters of Requests ceased to be
councillors and the committee became a court distinct from the
Council. 61 Like the Star Chamber it employed the privy seal process,
as distinguished from the great seal process of chancery. Asaprerog-
ative court, it incurred the enmity of the common law courts, which,
after 1599, repeatedly declaredit illegal."' While not mentioned in the
at 98; SMITH, Op. cit. note 294, Book III, c. 7, 129; Zane, John M., The Five Ages of
Bench and Bar of England, I SELECT ESSAYS IN AGLo-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY
(1907) 694.
The King's Court of Requests should not be confused with the municipal small
cause courts also called Courts of Requests, such as those at London, Bristol and
other cities. LEADAM, op. cit. note 358, at liii; 3 BLACKSTONE, op. Cit. note 23, at
81.
39The Ordinance of 1390 (13 RICHARD II, 1377-1399) distributing the work
of the Council by providing that matters of "greater charge" should be de-
termined by the Lord Chancellor and certain members, but that bills of "lesser
charge" should be heard by the Lord Privy Seal and such of the Council as should
be present at the time, has been thought by PALGRAVE, op. cit. note 00, at 79,
to be the source from whichthe authority of the Lord Keeper's Court of Requests
derived. It may well be that this function of the Lord Keeper with his "more or
less shifting committee of an itinerant Council," as LEADAm, op. cit. note 358, at xi,
describes it, suggested to Henry VII the establishment of the permanent com-
mittee of the Council under the same magnate. And see: I HoLDswoRTH, oP.
cit. note 2, at 413; LEADAii, op. cit. note 358, at ix-xii, xxxv; BALDWIN, Op. Cit. note
5o, at 259, 284; Pollard, op. cit. note 276, at 341, 35.
360LEADAw, op. cit. note 358, at xii-xv, xxvii; I HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at
413; 3 BLACKSTONE, op. cit. note 23, at 40o.
3ILEADAM, op. cit. note 358, at xciii; I HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 413;
POTTER, op. cit. note 9o, at 68.362CoKE, op. cit. note 7, at 97 et seq.; LEADAM, op. cit. note 358, at xxii et seg.; I
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statute which abolished the Star Chamber, the Court of Requests
virtually fell with that court whose process it shared, and ceased to
function in 1642."3'
(To be continued)
HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 414; CARTER, Op. Cit. note 68, at ioO. As early as
159o, the Common Pleas began to issue writs of prohibition against this court.
See supra note 243.
M3LEADAm,, op. cit. note 358, at xlvii et seg.; i HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at
415; CARTER, op. cit. note 68, at 1O; 3 BLACKSTONE, op. cit. note 23, at 50.
